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INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution of South Africa mandates that its Supreme Court use 
international law to determine the substantive meaning of its own Bill of 
Rights.1 The Constitution of the United States does no such thing. 
Nevertheless, from time to time, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken it upon 
itself to use international law as persuasive authority to interpret various 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution.2 Indeed, the Court has done so in very high 
profile cases such as Lawrence v. Texas,3 where the Court struck down a Texas 
anti-sodomy statute as an unconstitutional violation of due process;4 Roper v. 
Simmons,5 where the Court stated that capital punishment could not be 
constitutionally applied to those who had committed crimes under the age of 
eighteen;6 and most recently, Graham v. Florida,7 where the Court ruled that 
sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 
a non-murder crime was a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.8 
The high visibility of the cases in which the Court has called upon 
international law to determine the proper meaning of certain domestic 
constitutional provisions has brought a lot of attention to this practice. Indeed, 
this issue has stirred up a lot of academic emotions (such as they are) as well as 
engendered a passionate response from Congress. It is the lack of a specific 
interpretative mandate in the U.S. Constitution that has functioned as the 
springboard for much of the commentary, mostly critical, from the legislative 
branch of government and academia alike. Much of this criticism boils down to 
a simple exhortation to abandon this practice altogether because its use 
supposedly undermines democracy and the sovereignty of the United States.9 
 
 1 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 39(1)(b). The South African constitution also contains a provision suggesting 
(but not mandating) that foreign law be consulted in similar circumstances. Id. § 39(1)(c). 
 2 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie D. Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of 
Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 
(2005) (describing the long history of uses of non-U.S. law in the United States). 
 3 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 4 See id. 
 5 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 6 See id. 
 7 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 8 See id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII). 
 9 See Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and 
Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 69 (2004). Other commentators have argued that the concept of “sovereignty” 
is “rooted in mistake.” LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8 (1995) [hereinafter 
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW]. Henkin goes further to note that “sovereignty . . . is often a catchword, a 
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However, this proposed abandonment appears unlikely to happen as it seems 
that for the foreseeable future the U.S. Supreme Court will be composed of a 
majority of justices who, in some way or other, favor this practice. 
Nevertheless, on a specific point, those who criticize the consultation of 
international law in cases dealing with the interpretative complexities of the 
U.S. Constitution make a valid argument: the way in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court pursues this endeavor is seemingly ad hoc and therefore lacks coherence, 
method, and context.10 
This Article seeks to address this latter category of criticisms and proposes 
a method for the selection of international law within the framework of U.S. 
domestic constitutional interpretation. Only a methodological consistency that 
springs forth from a reasonable theoretical background can begin to quell the 
anxieties of those who see this form of constitutional interpretative practice as 
a somewhat veiled (if not overt) threat to the foundations of the Republic.11 
Most importantly, a sound methodological approach to this contemporary 
practice of constitutional reasoning serves one of the most important goals of 
judicial rulemaking within a democratic framework: plausible predictability. If 
the accusations of haphazardness and self-interest that accompany the Court’s 
persuasive use of international law as a tool of constitutional interpretation can 
be set aside via adoption of a cohesive technique, then surely the whole 
enterprise would be perceived as standing on much firmer ground even by the 
critics. 
Within this context, it is important to differentiate between international 
law and foreign domestic law. Both of these sources can provide a valuable 
repository of authority for U.S. courts to consult when formulating a particular 
doctrine of domestic constitutional law. Indeed, courts regularly utilize both of 
these sources in this way.12 However, the separate scopes, underlying policies, 
and processes of enactment of each of these bodies of law often are 
considerably different one from the other. Therefore, it makes sense to 
distinguish them when contextualizing their respective uses within this 
 
substitute for thinking and precision,” and that “[f]or legal purposes at least, we might do well to relegate the 
term sovereignty to the shelf of history as a relic from an earlier era.” Id. at 8, 10. 
 10 See Ramsey, supra note 9. 
 11 This sort of hyperbolic phraseology was indeed used by those seeking to discredit the practice. See 
Donald E. Childress III, Note, Using Comparative Constitutional Law to Resolve Domestic Federal Questions, 
53 DUKE L.J. 193, 197 (2003). 
 12 See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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framework of constitutional law.13 Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
so far failed to make this distinction. This has provided yet another reason for 
the critics to attack (in this case, most fairly) the whole interpretative 
enterprise. 
The issue of how and when international law should be utilized as 
persuasive authority within the context of U.S. constitutional reasoning is one 
of great import and almost equally great complexity. Comparative uses of 
different bodies of law have grown exponentially over the last twenty years as 
the world has become more globalized—this trend so far shows no signs of 
abating. However, the myriad possible combinations within different systems 
of law have left this enterprise fragmented, disorderly, and without a systemic 
centricity. Some have suggested that this reflects the reality of the practice and 
that no further intrastate and interstate coordination can be expected.14 Others, 
however, have begun the long and arduous course of giving this comparative 
enterprise a theoretical and operational contour in the hope of increasing its use 
and furthering its success.15 
It is from this latter vantage point that this Article arises. Part I offers a 
brief bird’s-eye view of the possible array of sources of international law that 
exist to which the constitutional interpreters can refer. In doing so, this Part 
points out the various subtleties that exist in international lawmaking and the 
effect that the various rulemaking processes that exist within this framework 
have on the reach and applicability of the promulgated rules. Part II addresses 
the goals of the comparative enterprise so that the use of international law can 
be better related to the context in which it is being employed. Part III 
undertakes a brief overview of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent use of 
international law as persuasive authority in constitutional interpretation. This 
Part illustrates the firm factual grounding that critics of the practice are on 
when they note the apparent lack of methodological consistency that exists in 
 
 13 A pair of previous articles addressed the propriety of distinguishing between international law and 
foreign domestic law as sources of persuasive authority for U.S. constitutional interpretation and proposed a 
methodology for conducting this process with respect to foreign domestic law. See Rex D. Glensy, 
Constitutional Interpretation Through a Global Lens, 75 MO. L. REV. 1171 (2010) [hereinafter Glensy, 
Constitutional Interpretation]; Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count? Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection 
of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357 (2005) [hereinafter Glensy, Which Countries Count?]. 
 14 See, e.g., Roger Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 57 (2004); Richard A. Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July–Aug. 2004, 
at 40. As is customary, the word “state” in the context of international law refers to a nation. 
 15 See Vicki Jackson, Yes Please, I’d Love to Talk with You, LEGAL AFF., July–Aug. 2004, at 46; Mark 
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999). 
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the Court’s decisions when it comes to the comparative deployment of 
international law. 
Part IV then addresses the concerns of those critics. By drawing on the 
policy foundations illustrated in Part II and the recent experience of the Court 
described in Part III, Part IV proposes a structure for the use of international 
law in this context. This framework consists of the balancing of three factors 
that the Court should take into account when utilizing international law: (1) the 
international dimension and ramifications of the case at hand; (2) the nature of 
the international norms that the Court is seeking to import; and lastly (3) the 
stated position of the United States, if any, regarding the specific international 
rule being consulted. Only by taking these factors into account can the process 
be properly contextualized and thus mature into a developed and mostly 
predictable endeavor that will go a long way toward immunizing it from the 
attacks of the critics. 
It is fundamental to address what this Article is not suggesting: that 
international law in any way, shape, or form should function as binding 
authority in a case revolving around the interpretation of a specific U.S. 
constitutional provision. In fact, Justice Kennedy recently stated that his use of 
international law in an Eighth Amendment case “does not control [the] 
decision.”16 In other words, the bandying about of the horror scenario where 
the General Assembly of the United Nations (“UN”) or the International Court 
of Justice promulgates resolutions or issues decisions that are binding upon the 
United States on matters of domestic constitutional law is nothing but a 
rhetorical ruse designed to deflect from the real issues regarding the use of 
international law.17 Therefore, all of the issues discussed in this Article are to 
be solely construed and applied to the context of international law being used 
as persuasive—in other words, non-binding—authority within the framework 
of U.S. constitutional decisionmaking and nothing else. 
 
 16 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033. 
 17 See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to Be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 199–201 (2005) (“If we’re relying on a 
decision from a German judge about what our Constitution means, no President accountable to the people 
appointed that judge, and no Senate accountable to the people confirmed that judge, and yet he’s playing a role 
in shaping a law that binds the people in this country.”). 
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I. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY 
The pantheon of sources of authority that could come under the rubric of 
international law is expanding rapidly whether one wants to adopt a rigid or a 
looser definition of the term. Thus, before constructing a theory and 
methodology upon which the U.S. Supreme Court can rely when consulting 
international law within the context of domestic constitutional reasoning, a 
reasonably defined universe of possible sources of international authority 
should be constructed so that the possible scope of the practice is not infinite. 
A lot has been written on what should be considered international law, what 
effect it should have on nations and their populations, as well as how it should 
be enforced. This Article does not purport to enter into those debates that are 
largely about the process and substance of international law as binding 
authority. Because the topic of this Article is about a process for the usage of 
international law as persuasive authority, the illustrative scope of the range of 
international law functions simply as a presentation of the repository of law 
from which it would be legitimate for the U.S. Supreme Court to draw. 
A. International Law 
International law is often considered somewhat of a mystery by those in the 
legal world who are not accustomed to its substantive rules and practices. A 
possible reason for this is that its systems of promulgation, recognition, and 
execution do not closely resemble their equivalent counterparts in domestic 
law and appear unfamiliar to the outside observer. Probably the most 
perplexing aspect of international law is that, by and large, it does not bind a 
nation-state unless this state has by action or inaction consented to its 
application.18 Thus, for example, in domestic law, a speed limit on the freeway 
applies to all drivers whether they consent to be bound by it or not; but in 
international law, compensation rules for improper expropriation of assets do 
not apply to the expropriating country unless it has agreed to be bound by such 
rules. 
Equally confounding to those who question the legal status of international 
rules is the notion that, by definition, international law erodes national 
sovereignty by limiting the decisional power of a domestic regime within its 
 
 18 HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 27. This aspect gave rise to the now-famous adage that 
“almost all nations observe . . . almost all of their [international] obligations almost all of the time.” LOUIS 
HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (1979) [hereinafter HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE]. 
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own territory.19 Similarly, unlike domestic law, even if a nation has consented 
to be bound by a particular rule of international law, there appear to be no 
conventional ways of enforcing compliance with those rules should that nation 
ignore its undertaken obligations. All of these issues have generated 
considerable debate among scholars about the nature and place of international 
law within the repository of all law,20 but such debates, while fascinating and 
important, do not actually shed much light on the proper methodology to 
employ in using international law as persuasive authority for U.S. 
constitutional interpretation.21 
It is more relevant to simply set out what the possible sources of 
international law could be under the pertinent rules of recognition dictated by 
international law itself. Fortunately, on this point, there is considerably more 
agreement.22 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”),23 which is the implementing statute of the ICJ (the UN’s highest 
judicial entity), provides the following guidance: 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law.24 
The above statute makes it clear that international conventions (treaties) 
and customary law are the first two sources of international law upon which 
the ICJ relies upon to reach its rulings. Against this foreground, the statute also 
 
 19 HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 18, at 29–30. 
 20 HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 63–64. 
 21 The particular status of a specific substantive law under international rules is nonetheless a crucial 
factor in determining whether and how it ought to be employed in the context of constitutional reasoning. See 
infra Part IV.B.2. 
 22 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 13 (2d ed. 2006). 
 23 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
 24 Id. 
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exhorts the import of “general principles of law” (background norms)25 and 
suggests some methods for gleaning where the law might lie.26 Even though 
these two areas of law still function as the primary sources for the formation of 
international law, the repeated interaction of quasi-governmental entities such 
as international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and 
multinational enterprises27 has given rise to a third source of law that has 
quickly emerged as an important player in the international law field: so-called 
soft law.28 The range of these three sources is detailed below. 
1. Treaties 
Treaties are probably the preferred contemporary way of making 
international law. Although part of most anciens régimes, this form of 
delineating international rules and duties has survived and flourished in the 
modern era. The reasons for the continued (and increasing) popularity of 
treaties in today’s world are plentiful. First, the substantive rules of treaties, 
although open to the usual interpretative variables, are relatively easy to 
determine (especially compared with the other two sources of international 
law). Second, the problem of state consent identified above is largely mitigated 
by treaties because they are usually entered into through a recognizable 
affirmative act by the nation entering into them (this being an executive 
signature, a parliamentary statute, or a combination thereof). Third, treaties 
resemble in form and sometimes in substance, the controlling documents that 
pertain to domestic governance. Finally, treaties are more familiar to a 
domestic constituency and therefore might be more favored and accepted by 
such constituency.29 
Treaties come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes—they also can cover 
every possible relationship and subject matter. Therefore, treaties can be 
bilateral (between two countries), multilateral (between numerous countries), 
 
 25 Doctrines such as res judicata and collateral estoppel, which originate within the ambit of domestic 
law, are often borrowed to resolve international law disputes and are thus examples of those “general 
principles” adduced by Article 38. 
 26 BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 13. 
 27 Naturally, all of these players and others in the international law realm make diverse and often 
discordant claims of what constitutes “law,” who is rightfully applying it, and who is violating it. These claims 
only affect tangentially the analysis proposed herein and such effects are discussed in Part IV. 
 28 C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 850, 851 (1989). 
 29 See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, 
ACTORS, PROCESS 36 (2d ed. 2006). 
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and regional (covering only countries of a certain geographic area).30 
Furthermore, subject matters can range from broad scopes such as constitutive 
documents (for example, the UN Charter31 and the Treaty establishing the 
European Union32) and global agreements purporting to regulate the 
environment and human rights,33 to more narrowly tailored instruments that 
resolve the claims of warring nations or regulate trading deals between 
economic partners.34 Needless to say, the sheer array of possibilities regarding 
treaties, coupled with their increasing popularity, has resulted in their 
proliferation so much so that the United Nations Treaty Series—the catalogue 
of all treaties deposited with the UN Secretary-General—contains several tens 
of thousands of operative examples.35 
For the judge attempting to use international law as an aid to interpret the 
U.S. Constitution, identifying whether relevant law is contained in a treaty is 
not a complicated matter. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
defines a treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States in 
written form and governed by international law.”36 That leaves extreme leeway 
for the rules of recognition pertaining to treaties, even though the Vienna 
Convention does narrow the scope of state behavior pertaining to treaties by 
noting that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.”37 Thus, treaties represent a mostly reliable 
indicator of the content of international law. The most notable exception to this 
is when a treaty is deemed to conflict with a peremptory norm of international 
law (jus cogens), the result of which conflict results in the invalidation of the 
treaty.38 However, because there are only a few peremptory norms (such as the 
 
 30 See infra Part I.B. 
 31 U.N. Charter. 
 32 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 
115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 33 E.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 
10, 1948); BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 141 (discussing various multilateral environmental efforts including 
the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the 1985 Vienna Convention on the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer, and the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change). 
 34 E.g., BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 143 (discussing friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties); 
HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 18, at 77 (discussing the Korean Armistice Agreement). 
 35 United Nations Treaty Collection, UNTC, http://treaties.un.org/pages/UNTSOnline.aspx?id=1 (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
 36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, T.S. No. 58, 115 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 37 Id. art. 26. 
 38 Id. art. 53. 
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prohibition of genocide, slavery, piracy, and torture),39 it is indeed rare for a 
treaty to be voided for that reason, reinforcing the notion it is a safe to consult 
treaties when seeking to ascertain the content of international law. 
2. Customary Law 
State practice dictates the contours and substance of customary 
international law. As a result, customary international law “results from a 
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal 
obligation.”40 In other words, over the course of time, the practices of countries 
which repeatedly interact with one another will increasingly grow more 
convergent until eventually they reach a level of basic uniformity that gives 
rise to an implicit acknowledgement that such practice has to be followed out 
of a sense of legal requirement.41 No formal agreement, treaty, or statement of 
acquiescence is required for a rule of customary international law to rise to the 
level of binding authority.42 However, a rule of customary international law 
will not bind a nation that has objected to its substance while such rule was in 
the process of formation.43 Further, failure to object is considered to be implicit 
consent in the application of that rule and includes an assumption that the non-
objecting nations agree to be bound by it.44 There are a couple of exceptions to 
the ability of states to object to a rule of customary international law. First, 
nations that come into being after the formation of a customary rule, or for 
another reason did not have an opportunity to object during that rule’s 
formation, are precluded from exempting themselves from such a rule.45 The 
only other exception to the ability to object to a rule of customary international 
law was alluded to in the section above—that is the case of peremptory norms 
(being a form of über-customary international law) that cannot be derogated by 
any nation according to the dictates of international law.46 
While the rules for the formation of customary international law are easy to 
state, they are slightly less easy to implement, which has been the source of 
 
 39 There is wide disagreement as to when a rule of customary law matures into jus cogens. DUNOFF ET 
AL., supra note 29, at 59. Nevertheless, there is very little disagreement about the fact that the prohibitions 
listed in the main text have achieved that status. Id. at 59, 946. 
 40 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987). 
 41 This sense of legal obligation is often referred to as opinio juris. BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 16–17. 
 42 Id. at 16. 
 43 Id. at 21. 
 44 Id. at 22. 
 45 Id. at 24. 
 46 Id. 
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much scholarly commentary. Generally, state practice can exhibit itself in 
many different forms such as “diplomatic contacts and correspondence, public 
statements of government officials, legislative and executive acts, military 
manuals and actions by military commanders, treaties and executive 
agreements, decisions of international and national courts and tribunals, and 
decisions, declarations, and resolutions of international organizations, among 
many others.”47 Most often, some passage of time is required for a practice to 
ripen into customary law although the actual length of time is undefined and 
can range from relatively short periods to a span of many years.48 
Nevertheless, the key to a legal rule having the force of customary 
international law is the notion that states believe they have to follow such a 
rule out of a sense of legal obligation. 
American courts are very accustomed to dealing with all aspects of 
customary international law, including, and most relevant to the present 
discussion, identifying what the rule is and deciding whether it has acquired 
the status of customary law so that states feel legally obligated to follow it. 
This process is exemplified in the famous case of The Paquete Habana49 
where the U.S. Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the 
condemnation of two seized Spanish fishing boats as spoils of war was 
synchronous with the then-current understandings of international law.50 In a 
very detailed opinion, where the court examined the practices of many states 
throughout an almost 600-year history, it invalidated the seizures as being 
contrary to the “law of nations” and ordered the proceeds of the sale of such 
boats restored to their owners.51 Today, such forays into the Jurassic period of 
law are hardly necessary, as numerous contemporary sources of possible state 
practice exist. Thus, the court wishing to call upon such sources of 
international law as aids to constitutional interpretation is easily equipped with 
 
 47 DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 79. 
 48 BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 19. The International Law Association’s Committee on the Formation of 
Customary (General) International Law issued in 2000 a Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation 
of General Customary International Law, which illustrated how state sovereignty claims to continental shelves 
adjacent to their territory matured from a unilateral claim by one state (the United States) that went 
unchallenged by other nations, to other nations following suit, to, several years later, recognized international 
law concerning a state’s jurisdiction over its proximate continental shelf. INT’L LAW ASS’N, COMM. ON 
FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INT’L LAW, STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO GENERAL 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 20–21 (2000). 
 49 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 686–708. 
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the factual and analytical tools necessary to successfully deploy such 
resources. 
3. Soft Law 
Treaties and customary law have not always proven ideal in regulating a 
whole series of modern international interactions. Some international 
relationships are not suited to the formal and somewhat rigid treaty-making 
and ratification process, nor are they very susceptible to the protracted ripening 
of state practices that is necessary for the formation of customary law.52 Thus, 
a third area of international rule-making has emerged that is generally 
referenced under the moniker soft law.53 This can be defined as a quasi-legal 
obligation that does not have binding force, but nevertheless is seen by players 
in the international sphere as a useful guide in determining the range of 
acceptable international conduct.54 Aside from official institutional bodies, 
non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations or advocacy groups 
that are playing an increasing and vital position in the administration of 
international governance have a role in the creation of soft law.55 
Examples of soft law that come from official institutional bodies are 
instruments such as UN General Assembly Resolutions, statements from other 
transnational bodies that are non-binding at inception, and decisions by 
international administrative agencies.56 
Other forms of soft law may include . . . joint communiqués and other 
instruments expressing shared political commitments of particular 
states, “gentlemen’s agreements” on the composition of international 
bodies and tribunals, codes of conduct such as those proposed by the 
apparel industry to regulate working conditions in foreign-owned 
garment factories, interpretative statements regarding  
treaties . . . programs of action for multilateral conferences, 
guidelines and reports prepared by expert groups, and countless 
others.57 
 
 52 DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 93 (giving the example of foreign direct investment). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 94. 
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Like many things that pertain to international governance, the status of soft 
law as law, quasi-law, or something else is debated vigorously.58 This debate is 
somewhat secondary to the discussion in this Article because international law 
in the context of constitutional interpretation is used as persuasive authority, 
which is the same as the nature of soft law within the context of international 
law. Thus, ab initio, the main point of relevance to the judge tasked with 
looking at soft law within the context of international law is to be familiar with 
its rules of recognition. Once those have been successfully dealt with, the force 
or import of soft law will become a factor to be weighed among others in 
deciding whether it should be deployed as persuasive authority to help interpret 
the U.S. Constitution.59 
B. The Regional Law Dilemma 
The lawmaking activities of regional organizations are playing an 
increasing role in international governance. For the purposes of this Article it 
becomes paramount to assess whether the law generated by the institutional 
bodies of these sorts of governing entities forms part of the “international law” 
equation, or whether it is more akin to the foreign law of single nations and 
thus to be assessed under different criteria.60 This assessment presents a duality 
of possible outcomes because regional law does indeed have a hybrid nature 
and therefore does present characteristics of both international law and the law 
of purely domestic regimes. For example, the constituent documents of many 
regional organizations such as the European Union are treaties,61 and thus 
resemble international law in its purest sense, but within such treaties there are 
often provisions, such as a bill of rights, that therefore resemble domestic 
law.62 Moreover, even though the rulemaking of these regional organizations 
often concerns the relationships between the constituent states (resembling 
 
 58 Steven Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 591, 612 (2000). Much of the debate surrounds the issue of how to determine whether a substantive rule 
of international governance is soft law or ripened customary law. Several factors have been identified to best 
determine the answer to this question, including looking at “the form, subject matter, and content of a 
document, as well as the intention of the parties.” Id. at 613. 
 59 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 60 Foreign domestic law is certainly part of those sources that can and should be used comparatively as 
an aid to U.S. domestic constitutional interpretation, but the methodology of its deployment, given its different 
generative policy purpose, should not be the same as that presented herein for international law. See, e.g., 
Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra note 13. 
 61 See TFEU. 
 62 See, e.g., Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) art. 6 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon] (incorporating 
and making binding upon all member states the European Convention on Human Rights). 
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international law), it might also reflect localized cultural effects pertinent to 
that region of the world (and thus be more domestic in nature). 
Even though this topic alone could be the subject of a whole article in its 
own right, on balance it is preferable to treat the law of regional bodies as 
international law rather than as domestic law. The paramount reason for doing 
this is that regional law, like international law, is the product of a coming-
together of more than one state at the very least, and, in most circumstances, 
many different states. Thus it reflects a collective rational choice that is 
international in its scope, unlike most domestic law. In other words, the 
international ramifications of a domestic governing choice—be it executive, 
legislative, judicial, or administrative—are seldom considered (unless the very 
topic of such choice is international), but the international consequences of the 
choices of the diverse entities encompassed within the organizational 
framework of regional bodies are almost always paramount to such choices. 
Therefore, the jurist contemplating the use of regional law as a source of 
persuasive authority for interpreting the U.S. Constitution should analyze that 
law from an international law, rather than a foreign domestic law, 
perspective.63 
II. THE NORMATIVE UNDERPINNINGS OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The use of international law within the ambit of U.S. domestic 
constitutional interpretation does not take place in a vacuum. Rather, it exists 
within the specific context of a global comparative enterprise where 
governmental bodies of all nations are cross-borrowing materials from both 
international and foreign domestic law. This enterprise operates with numerous 
policy goals in mind and has at its heart a theoretical ethos that permeates the 
whole process. 
In general, “[c]omparative legal practice is founded on an underlying idea 
that the laws of the world are commensurable or comparable, and on an 
equally fundamental idea that comparison can only continue to take place 
amidst ongoing diversity.”64 That is to say, “the contribution of comparative 
 
 63 See infra Part IV. 
 64 H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Law and Legal Practice, 75 TUL. L. REV. 977, 1002 (2001); see also 
Ursula Bentele, Mining for Gold: The Constitutional Court of South Africa’s Experience with Comparative 
Constitutional Law, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 219, 221 (2009) (exploring the views of the Justices of the 
Supreme Court of South Africa and noting that “[w]hether identifying universal norms, or gaining insight into 
the comparable constitutional provisions, these justices see clear benefits from exploring the opinions of 
constitutional courts in other parts of the world”). 
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law emanates not from pseudoscientific information gathering  
pretense . . . . What comparativists share . . . is a passion for looking beyond, 
an empathy for differences but also for similarities, a faith in the self-
transformative task of learning, and an interest in the form of knowledge 
itself.”65 Thus, the aim of comparative law “is less to borrow than to seek the 
benefit of comparative deliberation.”66 Because of this broad scope, 
comparative law does not merely confine itself to the context of constitutional 
issues (although the recent spate of articles on this matter seem to limit 
themselves to this context), but can also be invoked in cases involving 
statutory or common law questions, so that, in reality, comparative law is not 
really a separate area of the law at all, but a methodology.67 That is not to say 
that this methodology cannot have its own normative values separate and apart 
from any normative values pertaining to the substantive areas of the law to 
which, on a case-by-case basis, comparative principles are applied. But rather, 
it is a simple acknowledgment of the fact that a better understanding of the 
normative goals of comparative law can be achieved if one is cognizant of the 
true nature of the practice. 
A true understanding must also take into account the inherent normative 
values operating within the comparative framework. In other words, when 
embarking on any comparative endeavor, such as consulting international law 
to help interpret the U.S. Constitution, the language adopted “affects what [the 
jurists] say, what they see, how they think, what they feel, and what they 
are.”68 Thus, constitutional interpretation that relies on comparative analysis 
should not be viewed merely as a tool (which undoubtedly it is), but also as 
something with intrinsic value, with its own legal and expressive qualities, and 
possessing a normatively desirable “apolitical sensibility.”69 These normative 
rationales establish the goals that are then to be reflected in the principled way 
 
 65 Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 221, 229 (1999). 
 66 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 197 (2003). Indeed, 
“[i]t is a poor wit who lives by borrowing the words, decisions, inventions . . . and actions of others.” 
TREASURY OF SPIRITUAL WISDOM: A COLLECTION OF 10,000 INSPIRATIONAL QUOTATIONS (Andy Zubko ed., 
1996) (quoting Johann Kaspar Lavater). 
 67 See P. John Kozyris, Comparative Law for the Twenty-First Century: New Horizons and New 
Technologies, 69 TUL. L. REV. 165, 166–68 (1994). 
 68 JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM 56 
(1990) (referring to the language of economics). 
 69 David Kennedy, The Methods and the Politics, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND 
TRANSITIONS 345, 345 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003). 
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in which courts will decide how to use the proper sources of international law 
as persuasive authority. 
A. Globalization and Human Rights 
A commonplace observation of the present day is that the world is 
becoming increasingly interdependent. This interdependence manifests itself 
most notably in areas such as international trade,70 multilateral environmental 
agreements,71 and the pooling of political and military resources into 
multinational organizations.72 The legal arena too has not been immune to this 
interdependence,73 and is undergoing a process of “judicial globalization.”74 
This fact, and the legal challenge it presents, has not been lost on some recent 
members of the U.S. Supreme Court.75 
 
 70 In the modern era, public institutions such as the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) and the Rome International Institute for the Unification of Private International Law 
(“Unidroit”) have taken on an active role in developing transnational commercial law. See BEDERMAN, supra 
note 22, at 147. Similarly, modern NGOs comprised of merchants have “exercised substantial influence in 
making transnational commercial law.” Id. 
 71 See id. at 141 (discussing various multilateral environmental efforts including the 1979 Convention on 
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the 1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 
and the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change). 
 72 See, e.g., id. at 229–30 (discussing the 1998–1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo). 
 73 For example, Sujit Choudhry has noted that a proper understanding of modern constitutions can only 
be achieved through both local and global perspectives. See Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of 
Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 824 (1999). 
 74 Judicial globalization is described by Slaughter as a “messy” process of judicial interaction which is 
both vertical (between national and supranational courts, the former of which may or may not be bound to 
follow decisions of the latter) and horizontal (between equivalent national courts not bound to follow each 
other’s decision or bound by any formal mandate). See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 1103, 1103 (2000). Slaughter identifies five broad activities that constitute judicial globalization: 
(1) the interaction between national courts and supranational courts for the creation of a structured pan-
national legal system (with emphasis on Europe); (2) the march towards common human rights norms; (3) 
deference to foreign courts through comity; (4) national constitutional courts referencing each other in matters 
concerning interpretations of parallel constitutional provisions; and (5) meeting between the personnel of the 
courts in question. See generally id. 
 75 Justice Breyer has stated that 
[w]e see all the time, Justice O’Connor and I, and the others, how the world really—it’s trite but 
it’s true—is growing together. . . . Through commerce, through globalization, through the spread 
of democratic institutions, through immigration to America, it’s becoming more and more one 
world of many different kinds of people. . . . And how they’re going to live together across the 
world will be the challenge, and whether our Constitution and how it fits into the governing 
documents of other nations, I think will be a challenge for the next generations. 
John H. Cushman, Jr., O’Connor Indicates She Will Remain on Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2003, at A1. 
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From the normative standpoint, this increased global interdependence and 
its effect on the legal arena calls for a parallel increase in the use of 
international materials as persuasive authority for both pragmatic and 
substantive reasons. First, it seems common sensical that a jurisprudence that 
relies, to some extent, on comparative analysis, will better manage global legal 
relationships in general.76 Specifically, in those circumstances involving 
interpretations of constitutional provisions, seeking the wisdom of international 
materials is desirable given that “[c]onstitutional experience in other nations 
has become relevant to U.S. legal culture because of the tighter connections 
between legal practice in the United States and elsewhere that have developed 
in the past few decades.”77 
Second, the increase in communication between nations creates a global 
community, not just of the courts, but also of structured humankind.78 This 
leads participants in international legal discourse to think about themselves as 
“juridical citizens of the world,” rather than as representatives of a particular 
nation.79 This self re-identification that transcends institutional relationships 
creates a heightened sense of common enterprise and kinship that, within the 
legal consciousness, is expressed by a greater awareness of the international 
dimensions of those rights “that attach to all persons by virtue of being 
human”—that is, human rights.80 In other words, human rights are based on a 
commonality of human values that only in recent times has been highlighted 
 
 76 See generally Andrew Moravcsik, Conservative Idealism and International Institutions, 1 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 291 (2000) (describing the desirability of global governance through international institutions from a 
pragmatic perspective). 
 77 Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1306. 
 78 See Craig Scott & Philip Alston, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A 
Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise, 15 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 206, 212–13 (2000); 
see also Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1999, 2001 
(2003) (“Constitutions are community dependent, and the world is, to an increasing extent, a single community 
working from a shared set of core values when it comes to the definition of baseline human rights.”). 
 79 Scott & Alston, supra note 78, at 213. 
 80 See Jackson, supra note 15, at 45. In other words, people are governed by law that encapsulates 
principles that are “common to humanity” and the challenging of this law by foreign sources only strengthens 
the underlying principles embodied by those laws. See H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 
261, 298 (1987) (quoting Gaius); see also Lord Patrick Devlin, Morals and the Criminal Law, in THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 13 (1965) (“[S]ociety is not something that is kept together physically; it is held by 
the invisible bonds of common thought.”). From this universalist perspective, comparative law can be seen as 
“bridging the gap between law and society.” Ahron Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court 
in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 28 (2002). This follows from the “constantly changing” nature of 
society. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 10–11 (Greenwood Press 1970) 
(1928). 
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by the globalization process.81 Comparative law, in collaboration with 
international law, helps promote the international human rights agenda by 
acting within each nation through the voluntary pronouncements of each 
nation’s own state actors (as opposed to international law alone, which 
superimposes the supranational collective will upon each nation).82 Thus, 
decisions resulting from comparative analysis by domestic courts, as a means 
for the promotion of international human rights, have the potential to acquire a 
certain domestic legitimacy83 that rulings from international tribunals—that are 
far-removed from the general populace—do not.84 
The normative values that comparative law serves in the promotion of 
international human rights are both fundamental and egalitarian in nature.85 
The internationalization of these values is occurring because “[a]round the 
world, public law concepts are emerging, rooted in shared national norms and 
emerging international norms, that have similar or identical meaning in every 
national system.”86 Examples of these fundamental rights include “the concept 
of ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ in human rights law, the concept of 
‘civil society’ in democracy law, the concept of ‘the internally displaced’ in 
refugee and immigration law, [and] the concept of ‘transborder trafficking’ of 
drugs and persons in criminal law.”87 Thus, because of the important role 
played by comparative law in this area, “no longer is it appropriate to speak of 
the impact or influence of certain courts in other countries, but rather of the 
 
 81 See John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations of International Law: From State Consent to State 
Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 433, 447 (1997). 
 82 This view of the role of comparative law squares with Judge Posner’s observation that law can be “an 
instrument for social ends.” RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 405 (1995). 
 83 Legitimacy is not solely contingent on the mere use of comparative analysis, but also may depend on 
methodology of reasoning. See Choudhry, supra note 73, at 824. Choudhry, through a detailed examination of 
comparative interpretative methods (primarily by foreign courts) identifies three “interpretative modes”: the 
universalist (premised on a commonality of underlying norms and principles), the genealogical (through a 
shared historic relationship), and the dialogic (a reflective process whereby the normative component of the 
“home” constitution is identified and then related, or not, to the foreign counterpart). See id. at 825. 
 84 Thus, even though the European Court of Human Rights, whose decisions can formulate the 
interpretation of other human rights conventions and treaties, has a powerful voice as a promoter of 
international human rights law, see J.G. Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European 
Court of Human Rights 18 (2d ed. 1993), its decisions on their own have relatively little impact on the rest of 
the world not covered by its jurisdiction. 
 85 As expressed by Aristotle long ago: “We must urge that the principles of equity are permanent and 
changeless, and that the universal law does not change either, for it is the law of nature, whereas written laws 
often do change.” Aristotle, Rhetorica, reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1318, 1374 (Richard 
McKeon ed., 1941). 
 86 Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 305, 306 (2001). 
 87 Id. 
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place of all courts in the global dialogue on human rights and other common 
legal questions.”88 The impact of using international materials as sources of 
persuasive authority to aid in domestic decisions pertaining to human rights 
issues is aptly summarized by former Justice La Forest of the Supreme Court 
of Canada: 
[I]n the field of human rights, and of other laws impinging on the 
individual, our courts are assisting in developing general and 
coherent principles that apply in very significant portions of the 
globe. These principles are applied consistently, with an international 
vision and on the basis of international experience. Thus our courts—
and many other national courts—are truly becoming international 
courts in many areas involving the rule of law. They will become all 
the more so as they continue to rely on and benefit from one 
another’s experience. Consequently, it is important that, in dealing 
with interstate issues, national courts fully perceive their role in the 
international order and national judges adopt an international 
perspective.89 
That is not to say that the comparative enterprise is an exclusive alternative 
to international law in the promotion of international human rights.90 In fact, 
international law is “a legitimate and important influence on the development 
of the common law and constitutional law, especially when international law 
declares the existence of universal and fundamental rights.”91 Indeed, “[t]he 
rising use of international law in domestic courts across jurisdictions 
constitutes both symptom and cause of this globalization.”92 However, because 
comparative analysis by design passes through domestic gatekeepers 
(specifically, the local judges who render their decisions), it has the advantage 
of greater efficiency in that the normative goals are given immediate effect 
 
 88 Claire L’Heureux-Dube, Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA 
L.J. 15, 40 (1998). 
 89 Gerard V. La Forest, The Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in International Law 
Issues, 34 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 89, 100–01 (1996). 
 90 Like comparative law, the international law component of international human rights jurisprudence is 
also instinctively egalitarian. See Paul W. Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, 
and the New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (2000) (“International law does not see this world of 
politics based on power, threat, and sacrifice. Indeed, its contemporary ambition is to overcome this world, to 
achieve a fundamentally depoliticized global order of equality among states and universal respect for the 
individual.”). 
 91 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd. v. The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513, 657 (citing Mabo v. 
Queensland (1992) 175 CLR 42). 
 92 Reem Bahdi, Globalization of Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of International Law in 
Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 555, 555 (2002). 
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through a domestic ruling.93 Therefore, the agenda of international human 
rights is best served by the comparative enterprise, and doubly so if some of 
the sources of foreign persuasive authority are international law materials 
(originating from domestic courts or international bodies) that pertain to 
international human rights. 
B. Similar Problems, Similar Backgrounds, and Similar Texts 
The “communitarian considerations” that give rise to the usefulness of 
international persuasive authority in the area of human rights are equally 
applicable to other areas of the law.94 Thus, in more general terms, “as social 
debates and discussions around the world become more and more similar, so of 
course, do the equivalent legal debates.”95 Consequently, because “[s]tates are 
intricately linked by shared problems that require multilateral solutions,”96 
comparative analysis will be useful and desirable as one of the means to shed 
light on such problems.97 More often than not, the similar “problems” 
encountered by courts of different nations are linked by shared principles that 
are so common that they create a “normative backdrop,” such backdrop 
imposing the direction of the resolution.98 These common principles form a 
“family” of ideas all interrelated like a tapestry, such that the “strength of the 
thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole 
length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.”99 Reference to international law 
materials thus functions as the needle, connecting the related threads as a way 
of dealing with the reality that exists today of easily accessible foreign 
 
 93 Justice La Forest of the Supreme Court of Canada describes this process as one of “absorbing 
international legal norms . . . through our constitutional pores.” La Forest, supra note 89, at 98. 
 94 See Bahdi, supra note 92, at 589. 
 95 L’Heureux-Dube, supra note 88, at 23. 
 96 Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 417 (2000). 
 97 See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 534–36 
(1992) (adding that comparative analysis only retains its usefulness if the results are narrowly fitted to take 
into consideration the needs of the society to be affected by the decision). 
 98 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 507–08 (1989) 
(applying this reasoning to the interpretation of statutes). The commonality of such principles has been noted 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the court indicated that the 
rights denied by Colorado’s Amendment 2 are “protections taken for granted by most people either because 
they already have them or do not need them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless 
number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.” Id. at 633. 
 99 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 221 (4th ed. 1963). For example, several 
international and national declarations, constitutions, treaties, or statutes offer similar protections for the 
individual that there is, among certain nations, “a wide convergence of paramount constitutional norms.” 
Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Migration and the Bounds of Comparative Analysis, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 67, 69 (2001). 
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decisions that have previously rendered opinions on issues similar to those 
being tackled by our domestic courts.100 
Clearly, the connections between the foreign courts that cite international 
law and domestic ones that do the same will be stronger in certain instances 
than in others. Like for people, the strongest linkage identified by scholars is 
that deemed to be among legal “relatives.”101 Thus, a foreign nation found on 
the same family tree as that of the United States, will possess a “genealogic” 
link that will make comparative references to the jurisprudence of that foreign 
nation especially relevant,102 particularly when those references encompass the 
utilization of international law as persuasive authority. That would seem to 
primarily limit comparative references to countries whose law is in part based 
on the old English common law,103 but in light of the influence of U.S. 
jurisprudence on the rest of the world, courts in this nation need not confine 
themselves to referencing sources from countries that helped shape the legal 
landscape in the United States, but rather, domestic courts could similarly 
benefit from the insight of courts from nations that have received legal input 
from the United States if those nations shed any light on a proper methodology 
for the use of international law as nonbinding authority. In either event, 
referencing international materials being used as persuasive authority by 
nations with a familial relationship to the United States is normatively 
justified, and is similar in conception, to one state referencing, as persuasive 
authority, the laws of a sister state within the union. 
 
 100 In a sense then, one could argue that there is a pragmatic reason to favor referencing foreign materials 
as persuasive authority. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 227 
(1999); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) (explaining the 
virtues of pragmatist thought). Interestingly, Judge Posner seems to have mixed feelings about whether he 
favors this type of comparative practice. On the one hand, he has written that comparative law can be useful to 
the determination of certain cases dealing with Eighth Amendment issues, see Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic 
Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 14 (1996), but on the other hand, he has recently stated that a court in 
the United States “should never view a foreign legal decision as a precedent in any way.” Posner, supra note 
14, at 40. In a similar pragmatic vein, H.L.A. Hart has suggested that the use of comparative law can be part of 
the penumbral zone of judicial thinking, and in those instances, a decisionmaker can reference foreign 
materials to reach a conclusion. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 255 (2d ed. 1977). 
 101 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 15, at 46 (identifying those “relatives” as being “international or foreign 
texts inspired or influenced by the United States”). 
 102 The “genealogic” link is one of the three “interpretative modes” identified by Choudhry. See 
Choudhry, supra note 73, at 824. 
 103 See Posner, supra note 14, at 40 (noting that “[a]n English decision from the 18th century might be 
cited to establish the original meaning of ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ in the Eighth Amendment”); see also 
Shirley S. Abramson, & Michael J. Fischer, All the World’s a Courtroom: Judging in the New Millennium, 26 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 277 n.13 (1997) (noting that English law is mostly cited when it is old for historical 
context and examining Wisconsin citations on the matter). 
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Equally strong normative justification for referencing international 
materials arises in those cases where the international authority being 
scrutinized has interpreted texts similar to those under review by the domestic 
court.104 Indeed, it “would be a serious omission . . . to ignore this relevant 
body of precedents and the considerable judgment and experience they 
represent as it confronts similar difficult interpretive questions.”105 Even 
opponents of this enterprise concede that “[f]oreign materials are relevant to 
the interpretation of U.S. laws in numerous circumstances, most notably where 
the foreign courts have interpreted the same or parallel legal texts as those 
under consideration by the U.S. court.”106 Therefore, the adage that declaims 
“two heads are better than one” applies in this context and advises consultation 
of opinions which turn on similar textual interpretations as those being 
undertaken by the referencing court. Or, as succinctly put by Justice Breyer, 
“[i]f here I have a human being called a judge in a different country dealing 
with a similar problem, why don’t I read what he says if it’s similar enough? 
Maybe I’ll learn something.”107 A similar sentiment can be equally applied to a 
judge sitting on an international tribunal. 
C. Coordinating a Transnational Legal System 
With the proliferation of international agreements and treaties that has 
taken place over the last three decades, it was only a matter of time before 
litigation stemming from these agreements found its way into the domestic 
courts of participating nations. The application of international norms found in 
treaties by domestic judges has been relatively uncontroversial because the 
general opinion is that the ratification of a treaty constitutes a legally 
significant act, and that domestic courts should strive to hold national 
governments accountable to their legal commitments embodied by such 
 
 104 See Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional 
Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 254 (2001); see also Donald P. Kommers, The Value of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 685, 691–95 (1976). 
 105 Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 374 (1997). 
 106 See Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H.R. 
Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2d Sess. 
21 (2004) (testimony of Prof. Michael Ramsey). 
 107 Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Antonin Scalia, Debate on Foreign Law: Constitutional Relevance 
of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/ 
posts. 
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ratification.108 More controversy has arisen by applying this rationale to 
customary international law because, as critics claim, customary international 
law is not always formed with the consent of those allegedly bound by it.109 
Regardless of international law’s application domestically through treaties or 
customary law,  
[s]tripped of all technicalities . . . government in all its actions is 
bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make 
it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its 
coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual 
affairs on the basis of this knowledge.110 
The application of international law domestically not only serves to hold the 
government accountable to its people but, more importantly for the purpose of 
this Article, allows foreign nations to observe that the United States will live 
up to its international obligations, thus making other nations more willing to 
engage in a cooperative relationship with the United States. In other words, 
“[i]f international law does not have any impact on behavior, there is no reason 
for a country to waste resources on international legal conventions and 
negotiations.”111 
Comparative analysis based on international materials aids the further 
development of this cooperative relationship established by international law 
and the bodies that administer it. In fact, the “role of international institutions 
is increasingly, with the spread of liberal democracy, to help coordinate the 
policies of democratic states to promote common goals, including the full 
protection of human rights, within a context of substantial underlying 
 
 108 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power To Interpret International Law, 118 
YALE L.J. 1762, 1774 (2009) (explaining that “when international treaties become domestic law” via 
incorporation by the political branches, they become U.S. law that has “legal force . . . [and] give[s] rise to 
obligations within the legal regime of international law”). This rationale has been termed the “rule of law 
imperative.” See Bahdi, supra note 92, at 560. It is focused on a previously enacted treaty or accepted rule of 
customary law—in other words, international norms. In this optic “the rule of law framework represents the 
positivistic expression of state consent.” Id. at 565. 
 109 For example, Eric Posner has characterized this approach to judicial domestication of international 
norms as “Transnational Legal Process” (“TLP”). Posner expresses skepticism towards this approach, under 
which he says “courts act . . . under their own authority to compel citizens and the government to comply with 
international law that has never been formally incorporated into domestic law by the government . . . often 
called customary international law.” Eric A. Posner, Transnational Legal Process and the Supreme Court’s 
2003–2004 Term: Some Skeptical Observations, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 23, 26 (2004). 
 110 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944). 
 111 Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1844 
(2002). 
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agreement.”112 Thus, the coordinating necessity brought on by globalization is 
the source for an increase in the use of international law.113 This coordination, 
particularly in the area of international commerce, brings about a redefinition 
of the notion of the national “we,” because “who we are is harder to define 
when Japanese firms are major exporters from the United States, American 
firms produce more overseas than they export, and NGOs and political leaders 
who pressed for the land mines treaty [which the United States government 
opposed] included large numbers of Americans.”114 This “changing 
consciousness” in which the international and domestic courts are mutually 
reinforcing, leads to an emergence of “international” values that are capable of 
being applied at the national level, creating a “common language which cuts 
across boundaries and within societies,” which induces further cooperation and 
integration.115 
The step from a coordinating international law to a coordinating 
comparative practice is a very small one. Already, national courts are “quasi-
autonomous actors in the international system,” acting as “partners in 
enforcing international rules or as participants in a larger dynamic process of 
socialization in the service of compliance.”116 This has led to a “blurring of 
international law into comparative law.”117 Thus, “when a judge in a state that 
is not party to the European Convention on Human Rights invokes the 
Convention and its jurisprudence, the Convention has the same non-binding 
status as foreign law.”118 This merging of comparative law and international 
governance is a logical consequence in that both confront the same problems 
of “order above states,” which results in a need for effective cooperation.119 
 
 112 Moravcsik, supra note 76, at 305. 
 113 See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 
129 (1994). 
 114 JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER 164 (2002). 
 115 See Phillippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 527, 554–56 (2001). 
 116 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of 
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367, 391–92 (1998). 
 117 Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
501, 525 (2000). 
 118 Id. (emphasis omitted). In other words, the deployment of international law as part of U.S. 
constitutional interpretation treats international law as a form of foreign law. See Spiro, supra note 78, at 
2025–27. 
 119 See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International 
Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545, 557, 614–15 (arguing that in today’s project of “international 
governance,” comparativists seek to act as the “diversity department” to create a depoliticized private law and 
defend the autonomy of law). The author does recognize an essential difference between the objectives of 
international law and comparative law: the former seeking to “transcend [rather] than to comprehend 
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D. Judicial Dialogue 
A related goal of comparative analysis to cooperation is to foster an 
ongoing dialogue between courts around the world. This “global community of 
law” which consists of “overlapping networks of national, regional, and global 
tribunals,”120 arises as a result of a new self-conception of each participant 
court as being part of a “larger judicial community” that crosses artificial 
notions of territoriality,121 and communicates among itself through judicial 
opinions and decisions. Thus, “[b]y communicating with one another in a form 
of collective deliberation about common legal questions, these tribunals [which 
participate in the dialogue] can reinforce each other’s legitimacy and 
independence from political interference” and “can also promote a global 
conception of the rule of law, acknowledging its multiple historically and 
culturally contingent manifestations but affirming a core of common 
meaning.”122 This “community of law” is characterized by relationships 
between legal “actors”123 that are consistent with each individual participant’s 
interests, coupled with the participants’ awareness that the whole process takes 
place on a nominally apolitical plane.124 In sum, “a community of law is a 
community of interests and ideals shielded by legal language and practice,”125 
whose desirability arises from the recognition that proper legal practice is not 
necessarily confined to one system and nation. 
The specific content of the dialogue, and the particular motivation of the 
conversing courts, will vary considerably depending on which courts are 
“speaking” to one another. Moreover, the type of reception that a particular 
 
difference,” while for the latter the goal is not to transcend difference, but to explore it (to see “what’s in, and 
out, who’s good and bad, what’s new and old”) in order to decide its relevance and its persuasive capabilities. 
See id. at 546–47. 
 120 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 105, at 282, 370 (noting that judges around the world consider 
themselves as part of this global legal community “by virtue of either their role in implementing international 
norms or a common conception of their role and function within domestic legal systems and a common 
commitment to the rule of law”). This type of self-conception provides for a natural opening to foreign 
materials as persuasive authority. 
 121 See Bahdi, supra note 92, at 558. 
 122 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 105, at 282. 
 123 This emphasis on “actors” signifies that, like for many other rationales underlying comparative 
analysis, a transnational judicial dialogue relies on a notion of horizontal global governance—one consisting of 
“national government officials rather than international bureaucrats, decentralized and informal rather than 
organized and rigid.” Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, 
in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 178, 202–03 (Michael Byers ed., 2000). 
 124 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 105, at 367–69. 
 125 Id. at 370. 
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international source will receive in a domestic court will similarly vary 
considerably in each particular circumstance.126 Thus, the “dialogic” process is 
an interactive one,127 where the tenor of conversation might not always be one 
of agreement.128 As noted by Anne-Marie Slaughter,  
[W]hereas a presumption of a world of separate sovereigns mandates 
courtesy and periodic deference between them, the presumption of an 
integrated system [where judicial dialogue is commonplace] takes 
mutual respect for granted and focuses instead on how well that 
system works. It is a shift that is likely to result in more dialogue but 
less deference.129  
However, the shift to open dialogue implies a greater reflective process by 
the deciding courts. This should tend to lead to better opinions because 
“decisions about what ought to be done are improved by reflection, by an 
exchange of views with others sharing the same problems, and by imagining 
various situations that might be presented.”130 
E. Expanding Horizons 
The evolution of legal history is replete with highly esoteric discussions 
concerning the ultimate goal of the law. Notions of order, fairness, justice, 
utility, structure, and equality (as well as many others) have been tossed 
around as being the primary engine that drives the legal train.131 Regardless of 
the legal philosophy to which one subscribes, it can scarcely be contradicted by 
anyone that the legal product in any legal system should strive to be as good 
and correct as it can be. The selective reliance on international persuasive 
authority goes a long way into achieving this in legal systems, such as ours, 
 
 126 In other words, “as courts look all over the world for sources of authority, the process of international 
influence has changed from reception to dialogue.” L’Heureux-Dube, supra note 88, at 17, 21 (stating that as 
courts “mutually read and discuss each other’s jurisprudence,” in order to determine new problems, 
comparative sources become part of the “broad spectrum of sources,” used by the courts). 
 127 See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now, 1 EUR. L.J. 259, 265 (1995) 
(describing the relationship between the European Court of Justice and national supreme courts as “pluralistic 
rather than monistic, and interactive rather than hierarchical”). 
 128 See, e.g., Queen v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 702 (Can.) (stating where this dialogue resulted in 
an informed rejection of the foreign source). 
 129 Slaughter, supra note 74, at 1115; Slaughter, supra note 66, at 194. 
 130 Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 668 
(1958). Fuller imagines that such a completeness of deliberation results “not merely [in] a more apt choice of 
means for the end sought, but a clarification of the end itself.” Id. 
 131 See generally LUIGI MIRAGLIA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY APPLIED TO LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
(A.M. Kelley 1968) (1912). 
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where adjudicators are called upon to use interpretative skills in providing a 
resolution to a legal problem.132 
Specifically, by deploying international law used comparatively, the judge 
“expands the horizon and the interpretive field of vision,” so that 
“[c]omparative law enriches the options available.”133 This squares with the 
comparativist ethos which does not solely aspire to rule, but to understand the 
underlying nature of each decision.134 The quest of understanding inevitably 
leads to a necessity to have the mind of the jurist be stretched and stimulated, a 
process that will result in a better legal product.135 In the immortal words of 
Justice Brandeis, “if we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our 
minds be bold.”136 
One of the ways in which such stimulation will occur is through access to 
international materials’ rationales on similar issues to those being treated in the 
domestic forum. These sources of international law might provide the domestic 
court with a “fresh, provocative” way to resolve the issue at hand, and thus it 
will inform, illuminate, and challenge a domestic court’s long-held 
assumptions.137 “[T]he use of comparative law can inspire the interpreter to 
find the interpretation that is best with regard to his own country’s law” by 
“provid[ing]the interpreter with new ideas” and by “contribut[ing] to the 
interpreter’s understanding of the [text] he has to interpret.”138 In Bruce 
Ackerman’s simple words, international law used as persuasive authority can 
provide some “old-fashioned insight” to a reviewing domestic court.139 
 
 132 The implication is that ours is a system that relies, to a certain extent, on the indeterminacy of legal 
issues and the jurists role in discovering the answer to a particular set of problems. Thus, the amplification of 
the discovery process through the use of foreign materials fits into this conception of legal design, most 
associated with realist legal theory. See, e.g., Knop, supra note 117, at 503. 
 133 AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 197 (2006). 
 134 See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 555–56. 
 135 See Jackson, supra note 104, at 259–60 (citing H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. 
REV. 659, 695 (1987)); Michael Kirby, Think Globally, 4 GREEN BAG 287, 291 (2001) (stating that this 
comparison will “stimulate [the] mind with analogous reasoning”). 
 136 Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 520 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 700 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Brandeis). 
 137 It is the mere fact of the challenge that in itself enhances the ultimate quality of the final judicial 
product. See THOMAS MUNRO, TOWARD SCIENCE IN AESTHETICS 73 (1956) (noting that a judge, “[b]y 
comparing his judgment with those of others . . . can further discover the extent to which it is in accord with 
the consensus of social experience [and] [i]f he then still reaffirms his [initial] judgment, it will be a more 
conscious and tested one, and less a product of blind impulse”). 
 138 Jens C. Dammann, The Role of Comparative Law in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 14 
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 513, 522–23 (2002). 
 139 See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 775 (1997). 
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The impact of observing international law practice in a particular 
circumstance not only ameliorates the specifics of that case, but also 
contributes to the betterment of the legal system as a whole by bringing to the 
table new, valuable, substantive ideas. Justice Ginsburg expressed her 
appreciation of the possibilities of international materials (among other foreign 
sources) to U.S. jurisprudence in these exact terms when she noted that the 
Supreme Court could “do better” if it incorporated comparative analysis from 
other nations “who by years of labor, research and experience, have made 
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.”140 
Similarly, Goldsmith notes that international sources gather their strength 
through substance (rather than process) and that it is the ideas contained within 
these sources that contribute to their success.141 In other words, the addition of 
international materials intrinsically enhances the discourse of the legal system 
in which such materials are incorporated. 
A third form of such expansion that is more pragmatic in nature 
accompanies the intrinsic and particular expansion of horizons operated by 
comparative analysis illustrated above. This specific normative impulse relies 
on the use of comparative materials as a way “to achieve specific ends based 
on positive reasoning about how those ends may be achieved.”142 Under this 
guise, comparative analysis is integrated with other methods of judicial 
reasoning, so that comparative references to international law not only affect 
the results of the particular cases but also have an impact in shaping “the 
system within which [they] operate[].”143 Thus, the practice of referencing 
international law as persuasive authority expands the panoply of methods that 
enable judges to adequately explain the rationales behind their opinions, 
enhancing the level of persuasiveness and legitimacy of the particular decision 
and the court rendering it. The exploration of international materials within 
judicial opinions for the sake of strengthening the conclusions reached therein 
is therefore conceptually pragmatic because pragmatism evaluates “the success 
of a philosophy not in terms of its correspondence to ultimate eternal truths, 
 
 140 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (quoting the Court in The Paquete Habana, 175 
U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). 
 141 Jack L. Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 327, 337 (2000) (referring to the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki 
Accords). 
 142 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law: Liberal 
International Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 717, 719 
(1995). 
 143 Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 409, 412 (2003). 
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but based upon its usefulness as a practical tool to yield better, more satisfying 
experiences.”144 That is not to stay that method, or style, is less important than 
intrinsic merit. In fact, style “is important, not only in the message conveyed to 
lower courts, but also in what it says about the attitudes of those judges who 
are choosing between different styles of decision-making.”145 The pragmatic 
thought that underlies the use of international materials as persuasive authority 
merely reflects a “relativistic theory [that] has wisely emphasized the danger of 
deciding problems of valuation by appeal to any general standards, and has 
urged instead that each problem be dealt with afresh, in its own terms, by 
intelligent analysis of the special conditions involved in it.”146 
The expansion of appropriate sources of persuasive authority to include 
international law also serves the value of encouraging a jurisprudence that 
moves forward by relying on past experience without foregoing the 
progressive thrust of cautious experimentation. As stated by Justice Holmes, 
“[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”147 Experience 
is grounded in time, and is both individual and collective, the former being 
more limited than the latter. As such, 
[t]he experience of any moment has its horizon [in that] [e]ach man’s 
experience may be added to by the experience of other men, who are 
living in his day or have lived before; and so a common world of 
experience, larger than that of his own observation, can be lived in by 
each man148  
Nevertheless, “however wide it may be, that common world also has its 
horizon; and on that horizon new experience is always appearing.”149 By 
opening up to an international experience that has already resolved issues 
being confronted by domestic courts for the first time, our courts can proceed 
with an accumulated knowledge that provides the domestic adjudicator with a 
ready-made illustration of the workability of that particular legal solution, 
 
 144 Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism be Radical? Richard Posner and Legal 
Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687, 688–89 (2003) (noting the local quality of pragmatism with respect to giving 
solutions to problems, taking into account the peculiarities of the locality bound by the solution). 
 145 Harding, supra note 143, at 429. 
 146 MUNRO, supra note 137, at 78. 
 147 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Harvard ed., 1963) (1881). 
 148 SUSANNE K. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY: A STUDY IN THE SYMBOLISM OF REASON, RITE, 
AND ART 5 (3d ed. 1957) (quoting C. Delisle Burns, The Sense of the Horizon, 8 PHIL. 301 (1933)). 
 149 Id. 
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which, in turn, alleviates the trepidation of being the first to introduce a 
particular legal concept.150 
Lastly, the limitless horizon brought forth by the experience of 
international law helps to counter modern “know-nothingism”:151 a disturbing 
undercurrent, or backwash, present in today’s American legal discourse. This 
term refers to the implausible belief that the United States cannot possibly 
benefit from “powerful and sophisticated” arguments of other legal regimes.152 
This unilateral and arbitrary self-confinement only contributes to belittle a 
legal system.153 It is axiomatic that a “lawyer, even in the most mundane 
practice, will be impoverished if he wears the blinders of his own 
jurisdiction.”154 Thus, because “no justice should cut off knowledge and 
analysis of foreign law if it can help the court reach a better understanding of 
our own,”155 aid should be “sought where it may be found, and there are no 
formal limits to the search.”156 
Limiting persuasive authority solely to the product originating within our 
borders would fly in the face of prevalent legal theory that has developed 
throughout the last century and has moved away from excessive formalism. 
Thus, to the “extent that the law . . . is not definitely made and  
imposed . . . but is rather chosen . . . in an ongoing process, the underlying 
notion of law is that of enquiry” and as a consequence “[t]here is never a 
 
 150 See Kai Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View, 16 B.U. INT’L 
L.J. 331, 390 (1998) (referring to the prior experience of foreign courts as a sort of “field observation” of a 
country where a specific concept has already been tested). 
 151 See Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 347, 352 (2000). 
 152 See id. 
 153 As observed by Justice Abramson of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin: “If you look at the American 
law . . . in isolation from the rest of the world, you do not hear or ask [certain] questions” adopted by other 
people. See Abramson & Fischer, supra note 103, at 284. 
 154 Kozyris, supra note 67, at 168. 
 155 Jackson, supra note 15, at 46. 
 156 Glenn, supra note 80, at 267 (noting that judges are “called upon to decide cases or enact norms or 
give opinions, but the search for law is too important for any potential external source to be eliminated a 
priori”). This “leave no stone unturned” concept is similar to Dworkin’s Judge Hercules, who, when 
canvassing the whole of the relevant universe, will inevitably look across the oceans to see how foreign courts 
have coped with similar questions and then square such authorities with the pertinent precedent, the textual 
provisions, the normative questions, to reach the most informed and authoritative decision. See Ronald 
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1083 (1975). Some critics of comparative analysis deem Judge 
Hercules not to be up to the task of comparative analysis. See Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and 
Power, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 820–21 (2000) (stating that allowing foreign materials into the 
process of domestic adjudication will “introduce[] a whole new range of materials to the texts, precedents and 
doctrines from which the Herculean task of constructing judgments in particular cases proceeds”). 
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closing of sources, never a declaration of satisfaction with existing knowledge, 
never a pure process of deduction from a single given, never an entire 
commitment to an exclusive paradigm of law.”157 In fact, “[t]he nationalization 
of law has made it vulnerable[:] . . . [i]n seeking to bind it fails to persuade and 
resistance becomes easier to justify than adherence.”158 This follows from the 
fact that “[w]hen one is immersed in his own law, in his own country, unable 
to see things from without, he has a psychologically unavoidable tendency to 
consider as natural, as necessary, as given by God, things which are simply due 
to historical accident or temporary social situation.”159 Therefore, “[t]o see 
things in their true light, we must see them from a certain distance, as 
strangers, which is impossible when we study . . . phenomena of our own 
country.”160 Authorities steeped in international law allow us to achieve that 
distance. 
F. Increasing Self-Awareness 
The analysis of international law materials as persuasive authority helps 
courts in the United States enhance their knowledge and appreciation for the 
legal practices of those international regimes being observed. However, 
together with this increased erudition, comparative analysis of international 
authority provides a “unique opportunity to generate critical, subversive self-
reflections about American law.”161 In other words, comparative law functions 
 
 157 Glenn, supra note 80, at 288, 293 (tying the use of persuasive authority to a discrediting of the 
“declaratory theory” of law which wants the judiciary simply to identify pre-existing law rather than 
discovering the most persuasive result from any source available). 
 158 Id. at 297. 
 159 Kathryn A. Perales, It Works Fine in Europe, So Why Not Here? Comparative Law and Constitutional 
Federalism, 23 VT. L. REV. 885, 902 (1999) (quoting Pierre Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law, 35 
HARV. L. REV. 838, 858 (1922)). 
 160 Id. Taking a few too many steps back for better observation works both figuratively and in actuality. 
Bertrand Russell once observed that  
if several people are looking at [an object] at the same moment, no two of them will see exactly 
the same distribution of colours, because no two can see it from exactly the same point of view, 
and any change in the point of view makes some change in the way the light is reflected.  
BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 12 (1912). However, as proximity to the object 
decreases, equality of perception by the two observers increases (even though it will never be exactly the 
same). By combining the observations of the two watchers, a better picture of the actual shape of the object 
will be produced. Similarly, by combining different national and foreign experiences on a particular legal 
issue, a better resolution of that issue will be achieved. 
 161 George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 695 (1998) 
(using the term “subversive” to denote a progressive impulse in opposition to an “establishment” mode of 
preservation of the legal and structural status quo). But see Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1307 (viewing 
comparative law as an agent for preservation or change). 
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as a mirror so that by “seeking to learn from comparative . . . law, U.S. 
lawyers, academics, and judges run the risk of going abroad only to meet 
ourselves.”162 Specifically, comparative law “also operates like a rhetorical 
literary device, such as satire or simile, by forcing national values out in the 
open . . . [i]t offers judges a powerful tool to stimulate self-reflection and 
introspection” facilitating “a process of introspection and self-discovery” that 
“acts as a mirror that helps reflect the values already inherent, though not 
altogether obvious, in the domestic order.”163 
But the reflective power provided by comparative law not only produces a 
superficial picture, but actually pierces the surface and thus is more akin to a 
combination of mirror and x-ray machine.164 Thus, “comparing oneself to 
others allows for greater self-knowledge,”165 a fundamental intrinsic value 
described by Aristotle, among others.166 Under this rationale, a Supreme Court 
(or lower court) espousing the comparative enterprise will function not only as 
an adjudicator, but also as an educator,167 or analyst. In this way, comparative 
law rises to an internal ethos, or self-sustaining motivating force, in contrast to 
a purely determinate tool to be used as a means to an end.168 
 
 162 Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1307 (applying this concept to comparative constitutional law); see also 
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 57 (1983) (noting that foreign practices can provide a spotlight). Of 
course, mirrors not only provide a reflection, but allow the observer to self-identify blemishes and other 
markings on herself, a parallel equally applicable to the legal context and foreign law. See Knop, supra note 
117, at 531 (citing Mayo Moran, Talking About Hate Speech: A Rhetorical Analysis of American and 
Canadian Approaches to the Regulation of Hate Speech, 6 WIS. L. REV. 1425, 1513 (1994) (“What always 
seemed simple and natural becomes, through force of comparison, complex and problematic.”)). 
 163 Bahdi, supra note 92, at 575, 584 (applying the above rationale to international law and noting that 
introspection plays into the persuasive nature of foreign sources as reference to these authorities occurs 
“because [such authorities] reflect domestic norms and not because they oblige the nation in any way” thus 
creating “spaces for judicial freedom”). 
 164 The imaging powers of mirrors and x-ray machines also illustrate the concept that ready-made 
assumptions (about our health, for example) are much more complex than what is superficially apparent. As 
phrased by Bertrand Russell: “In daily life, we assume as certain many things which, on a closer scrutiny, are 
found to be so full of apparent contradictions that only a great amount of thought enables us to know what is 
that we really may believe.” Russell, supra note 160, at 10. Foreign authority, thus, can expose the apparent 
contradictions and complexities of our domestic law, which in turn leads to an internal reassessment through a 
greater amount of thought. 
 165 Barak, supra note 80, at 110. 
 166 See ARISTOTLE, THE METAPHYSICS 11 (John H. McMahon trans., Prometheus Books 1991) (“All men 
by nature are actuated with the desire of knowledge.”). 
 167 See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
961, 965 (1992). 
 168 See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject, 11 TUL. EUR. & 
CIV. L.F. 49, 60 (1996). 
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The impact of the increase in a nation’s legal self-awareness is not felt just 
at home, but has consequences on the international arena. The interlocution of 
international law materials can act as a signal to the international community 
that the nation that is willing to be persuaded from abroad has earned itself a 
rightful place among the community of nations. As noted by one commentator: 
Globalized self-awareness reflects a judicial desire to be accepted by 
an international community. This desire for acceptance betrays itself 
most clearly when judges invoke the notion of “civilization.” 
Judgments across jurisdictions proclaim the desire to be part of a 
“civilized” world of judgment. The concept of civilization remains, 
of course, inherently value laden and relational—one is not 
“civilized” in isolation of others. Rather, the notion of being 
“civilized” requires one to live up to certain standards that are 
external to one’s self; it signals a desire for participation in and 
acceptance by a community that has the power to define the standards 
of acceptance.169 
Of course, acceptance into the community of nations (or at least within the 
community referenced in the quotation above that calls itself “civilized” from a 
Western viewpoint) can come at any time in the life a particular nation. Thus, 
in the case of post-apartheid South Africa, the Supreme Court of that country 
has made it clear that the use of foreign law in domestic decisionmaking serves 
the purpose of announcing the arrival of the new South Africa to the world.170 
Put another way, the judge of this emerging democracy signals, through the 
use of foreign law, that his legal “culture is already open to learning from 
experience elsewhere.”171 Citing to foreign law therefore becomes a way of 
enhancing the product to a specific audience.172 
This self-defining form of self-awareness used to announce oneself to the 
world is not confined to nations but is equally applicable to institutional 
bodies. Hence the European Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights have enhanced each other’s standing by persistently referencing 
each other’s decisions.173 The increasing reliance by these bodies on 
 
 169 Bahdi, supra note 92, at 591. 
 170 See S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 171 Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1304. 
 172 See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial 
Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 502 (2000) (discussing how judges 
have made efforts to use human rights law as a “distancing device” to settle disputes without appearing to rely 
on personal taste or political judgment). 
 173 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 105, at 326 (explaining that the constant cross-referencing of 
decisions enables comparative law to function as a tool to enhance self-legitimacy); see also Thijmen 
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international sources as a self-legitimizing force indicates that self-definition 
might not necessarily commence at the beginning of a new era (such as the 
birth of the post-apartheid South African state), but can occur in the middle of 
an ongoing process.174 In such instances, comparative analysis has a 
“redemptive” character,175 and encompasses a search for a collective identity 
that encompasses a historical perspective that attempts to assess the question of 
“where we come from” in contemporary and forward-looking terms. 
G. Impact on the Rest of World 
One of the staples of the United States’s success in the world in terms of its 
influence on other countries has been its ability to reshape other nations in its 
image.176 This reshaping ability of the United States is active in numerous 
international spheres such as international relations and international trade.177 
Furthermore, the legal arena has similarly been a theater in which the United 
States has “stepped up [its] role abroad in spreading the gospel about the 
virtues of the American legal system.”178 Continuing with the biblical parallel, 
it becomes apparent that the most effective way for “spreading the gospel” is to 
practice what one preaches. Thus, foreign nations are to be most impressed and 
influenced by an American legal system that is engaged within a judicial 
dialogue with other nations (through the use of comparative law)179 in the same 
way that engagement in international relations promotes both stability and 
 
Koopmans, The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads of Legal Traditions, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 505 
(1991) (arguing that it is comparative reasoning which has increased the European Court of Justice’s standing 
by force of the intellectual prowess that such reasoning involves). 
 174 For example, the Treaty of Rome, which established the framework of the European Economic 
Community (the precursor to the European Union), was negotiated and approved by sovereign states without 
moving toward European “political-decisional-procedural” integration. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of 
Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2410 (1991). However, in time, the Treaty of Rome was judicially converted (to 
a certain extent, through comparative reasoning) into a more “constitution-like” document. See id. at 2403–31 
(detailing the “constitutionalization” of the community legal structure). 
 175 See Ackerman, supra note 139, at 794–95. 
 176 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology of National Greatness and Liberty, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 7, 10 (Thomas G. Patterson ed., 3d ed. 1989). 
 177 See, e.g., AKIRA IRIYE, ACROSS THE PACIFIC: AN INNER-HISTORY OF AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN 
RELATIONS 335–37 (2d ed. 1991) (describing how the United States’s use of Cold War defense treaties in East 
Asia allowed South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan to focus on developing capitalists economies and how internal 
political stability resulted in domination by leaders committed to a U.S. alliance); Hunt, supra note 176. 
 178 Abramson & Fischer, supra note 103, at 278 (commenting about the disconnect between this 
“spreading the gospel” attitude and American lawyers’ and judges’ reluctance to venture outside their borders 
to look for answers to domestic legal issues). 
 179 If there be any doubt of the potential reach and impact of U.S. court decisions in the world, one might 
only need to read the words of Justice L’Heureux-Dube of the Supreme Court of Canada. See L’Heureux-
Dube, supra note 88, at 19 (showing how U.S. Supreme court decisions have influenced the Canadian courts). 
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security for the United States.180 From this perspective, the reasons for 
participating in a global enterprise of comparative analysis track those for 
partaking in the creation of customary international law. In particular, the 
United States, by being the center of creating customary international law will 
impact and shape such law, and not abdicate its responsibility to less-than 
trustworthy regimes.181 
The other side of the coin is represented by the consequences for the United 
States if it decides to forego the increasing judicial conversation that is taking 
place between courts of different countries. The failure of U.S. courts to 
engage in this enterprise “weakens America’s voice as a principled defender of 
human rights around the world and diminishes America’s moral influence and 
stature.”182 In fact, because of the raised profile of the United States in the 
world, its actions are routinely more heavily scrutinized than those of other 
nations, and any notion of the United States disengaging from international 
dialogue, or behaving in a manner that is considered inappropriate by the 
international community, results in a greater diminution of influence than if 
those same actions were to be performed by another nation.183 This diminution 
of influence is already beginning to take its course, in large part due to the 
current Supreme Court’s predominantly regressive jurisprudence that has 
shown hostility to ideas and authority that originate from abroad.184 Thus, even 
though historically the United States has provided, through its Constitution, 
inspiration to many fledgling democracies,185 “the recent direction of United 
States constitutional jurisprudence has led most constitution-makers to seek 
alternative models.”186 Unfortunately, the United States is increasingly used by 
 
 180 See Michael Byers, International Law and the American National Interest, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 257, 257 
(2000). 
 181 See The International Judicial Dialogue: When Domestic Constitutional Courts Join the Conversation, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2061–62 (2001). 
 182 Roth, supra note 151, at 347. 
 183 For example, segregation had a significant negative impact on the United States’s relationships with 
other countries. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 100 (2000). Therefore, because “[a]n 
international pariah becomes far less influential in the international sphere . . . the United States certainly 
wants to retain a leading role in the creation of international law.” Steven R. Swanson, The Vexatiousness of a 
Vexation Rule: International Comity and Antisuit Injuctions, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 11 (1996). 
 184 See Ginsburg, supra note 140; see also Adam Liptak, American Exception: U.S. Court is Now Guiding 
Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html. 
 185 See generally Albert Blaustein, The Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad, 12 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 435 (1987) (providing a historical overview of the U.S. Constitution’s influence on a number 
of legal systems around the world, including upon the democracies of France, Japan, and India). 
 186 Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the “Rise of World 
Constitutionalism,” 2000 WIS. L. REV. 597, 598. 
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courts of other nations as a “counter-example” because “as a global 
constitutionalism begins to flourish, this failure to engage [by the United States 
Supreme Court (in particular)] threatens increasingly to marginalize the 
experience of the constantly evolving United States Constitution that was once 
the inspiration of all constitutionalists.”187 
Concerns about the reputation of the United States’s legal system similarly 
motivate an integration of comparative law within American jurisprudence. 
Reputation is an important component of a nation’s ability to function on the 
international stage, and historically, the United States, through its international 
leadership and its “commitment to the rule of law and to the betterment of the 
human situation,” obtained a reputation that drew other nations towards 
adopting its values and outlook.188 But reputation is a characteristic that needs 
constant feeding, and resting on its past laurels, or worse, showing disinterest 
or contempt for the international stage,189 will result in long-term damage to 
the United States’s reputation (which takes a long time to rebuild), with the 
consequent diminution of its ability to impact other nations.190 By showing 
willingness to consult legal ideas derived from international law principles, 
courts in the United States can go some way towards increasing their clout on 
the international stage, with the consequent improvement of the United States’s 
international reputation on the whole. Ultimately, it is in the interest of the 
United States to do so. 
Nevertheless, the “pursuit of self-interest is tempered by recognition of the 
legitimate interests of other players and a desire to encourage reciprocal 
behavior.”191 That is, because of the assured interaction between the United 
States (either through its institutions or its citizens) and foreign countries in the 
future, the United States would want to guarantee itself a modicum of 
treatment equal to the level of treatment such foreign countries (or their 
 
 187 Id. at 607, 616. 
 188 See Byers, supra note 180, at 259. 
 189 Such contempt was exhibited by the U.S. Supreme Court when it refused to follow (as a matter of 
persuasive authority) the suggestion of the ICJ, which ruled that Virginia violated the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations when it failed to inform a foreign death-penalty defendant of his consular rights. See 
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998). 
 190 For instance, “a decision to violate international law will increase today’s payoff but reduce 
tomorrow’s” with respect to the effect of such decision on the reputation of the country undertaking such 
decision. Guzman, supra note 111, at 1849. 
 191 Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State 
Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1920 (1992). 
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citizens) would receive in the United States.192 Thus, reciprocity, assisted by 
“transjudicial communication,”193 gives a regime a “longer shelf life”194 as it is 
helped along by international cooperation (or non-interference) of foreign 
nations. 
Many scholars have noted that the current lack of reciprocity (personified 
by the reticence of U.S. courts to participate in the comparative enterprise) is 
not going unnoticed in international bodies and foreign countries.195 
International judges too have noticed this retrenchment by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and its failure to cite international sources, particularly from those 
international tribunals that referred, or used to refer, to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s own decisions, thereby noting that (through reciprocity) those same 
international tribunals are going to rely on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
with less and less frequency.196 This attitude is exemplified by a Canadian 
Supreme Court decision preventing the extradition from Canada to the United 
States of two defendants who faced the death penalty.197 It cited, among other 
international authorities, Justice Breyer’s dissent in Knight v. Florida in 
concluding that the death penalty was being phased out.198 
The need to provide reciprocal treatment to other nations of the world has 
been exacerbated by the fact that the world has become more interconnected, 
and consequently, domestic law and activity increasingly have international 
 
 192 This might be referred to as the “golden rule” rationale that is similar to the classic formulations of 
comity even though it has been argued that “comity must mean something more than a ‘golden rule’ for 
private international law if it is to retain the character of a legal doctrine.” Joel R. Paul, Comity in International 
Law, 32 HARV. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (1991). Justice Ginsburg specifically identifies comity and a “spirit of 
humility” as reasons for engaging in comparative constitutionalism. Ginsburg, supra note 140, at 10. 
 193 See David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 571 (2001). 
See generally Slaughter, supra note 113. 
 194 See G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND THE 
REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 69 (2000). 
 195 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 545, 550 (1995) (commenting that U.S. courts treat the abortion issue as though it were a unique 
problem to the United States); Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to 
Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 273, 274 n.4 (1995) (noting that unlike U.S. 
courts, German courts pay attention to other countries’ constitutional decisions). 
 196 See, e.g., Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 
561 (1988) (making the same argument vis-à-vis foreign courts and pointing out that, although the United 
States has tried to export its interpretation of human rights overseas, its failure to import foreign interpretation 
of these rights has reduced its influence overseas). 
 197 United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.). 
 198 Id. para. 122. Contrary to the Knight majority opinion that rejected the very notion of comparative 
analysis, Burns invoked foreign authority to question the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied in 
that particular instance. 
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consequences, and vice versa.199 As a result of this interconnection, the United 
States has demonstrated that it holds no reservations to imposing laws and 
regulations over activities occurring abroad that supposedly have effect within 
its territory.200 It seems inconsistent to advocate a one-way ratchet approach to 
the effects of globalization that allows for exports but is resistant to imports, 
particularly when imports serve the same interests as do the exports. In fact, 
this excessive nation-centric view of the world, with the premise that any legal 
thought of any importance can only originate from the United States, seems 
largely obsolete in the new world order, and has already been rejected by the 
United States in areas such as international trade.201 Like recent developments 
in the area of international trade, the use of international law as persuasive 
authority for domestic cases merely acknowledges today’s global reality and 
serves the United States by offering reciprocity to other nations, thus 
enhancing its stature on the international legal stage. 
H. Conclusion 
Comparative analysis, like other legal disciplines, draws its strength from 
its normative justifications and their validity. This Part has described what 
various commentators have identified as the major goals (both intrinsic and 
instrumental) that the comparative practice serves for the United States. On the 
whole, advocates of the comparative enterprise tend not to fall into the same 
trap as do the formalist detractors of the practice, and concede that there are no 
“one-size-fits-all” uses for this discipline. Indeed, there is a general agreement, 
that one of the fundamental precepts of comparativism is its fluidity, meaning 
its functioning in a persuasive role, rather than a binding one.202 Hence, the 
normative justifications identified above will not always all be present in cases 
in which comparative analysis might be appropriate, and, in many instances, 
will not be present at all, thus obviating any need for such analysis. 
 
 199 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1672 
(1997) (quoting Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 
130) (stating that “[a]s integration increases, the ‘effect’ that local action will have beyond its own local border 
increases”). 
 200 See, e.g., BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 176–77 (2001) (discussing the “effects doctrine” and the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws). 
 201 For example, the United States has seen it to be in its interest to abide by, and push for enforcement of, 
international trade laws through its membership in the World Trade Organization. The World Trade 
Organization, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/wto-multilateral-
affairs/-world-trade-organization (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
 202 See, e.g., Daniel H. Foote, The Roles of Comparative Law: Inaugural Lecture for the Dan Fenno 
Henderson Professorship for East Asian Legal Studies, 73 WASH. L. REV. 25, 36 (1998). 
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However, the overall fact remains that the United States, through its now 
hundred-year old policy of international engagement, has assisted in creating a 
world-wide community premised on increasing global cooperation and 
integration. Through its conduct, the United States has, in large part, reaped the 
benefits of this participation, while other countries might not feel the same 
way. But “participat[ion] in a community over many years . . . creat[es] . . . a 
sense of entitlement to some benefits of community membership and a moral 
obligation based on . . . reasonable expectations.”203 In other words, an 
international system (including its legal component) largely shaped by the 
United States imposes a major responsibility on its creator to be receptive to 
the ideas originating from other countries that could help the operation of that 
system. 
If all other reasons fail to convince, “[a]t the very least . . . American 
judges should write . . . decisions with a conscious awareness that decisions 
from abroad, if considered, might complicate and challenge our analyses.”204 
As observed by Justice L’Heureux-Dube of the Supreme Court of Canada, “[i]f 
we continue to learn from each other, we as judges, lawyers, and scholars will 
contribute in the best possible way to the advancement not only of human 
rights but to the pursuit of justice itself, wherever we are.”205 
III.  PAST REFERENCES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Having identified the possible sources of international law that can be used 
as an aid to interpret the U.S. Constitution, and having posited several 
normative theories on which the comparative enterprise relies, it becomes 
incumbent in proposing a methodology for the appropriate selection of 
international law within the context of constitutional interpretation, to take a 
brief look as to what the U.S. Supreme Court has done lately in the matter. 
Because this Article proposes a methodology to be employed prospectively, 
only the most recent examples of the Court’s use of international law are 
 
 203 Gerald P. Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 
28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 696 (1981) (referring to Mexican immigrants’ participation in the community life of the 
United States (with the tacit approval of the official domestic authorities)). 
 204 Abramson & Fischer, supra note 103, at 284–85, 287 (stating that consultation of foreign law leads to 
a deeper understanding; comparing such law to “superstar amicus briefs” in that foreign decisions offer 
otherwise unavailable viewpoints from the world’s best legal minds). 
 205 L’Heureux-Dube, supra note 88, at 40. 
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relevant to the discussion. Moreover, other articles have already given detailed 
historical accounts of the use of foreign and international law in this context.206 
Some recent members of the U.S. Supreme Court have not demonstrated 
much reticence in their willingness to consult international law as an aid to 
constitutional interpretation. Because of the high-profile cases where these 
references have occurred, these forays have been keenly noticed.207 Some 
Justices have also spoken about this practice off the bench. Justice Ginsburg, 
for example, in two recent articles, decried the “island” or “lone ranger” 
mentality that sometimes infects domestic jurists and noted that “[w]e are the 
losers if we do not both share our experience with, and learn from others.”208 
Similarly, Justice O’Connor indicated that she was in favor of the U.S. 
Supreme Court citing decisions of the European Court of Justice.209 
The recent attention paid to this particular use of international law, while 
important qualitatively, has not borne fruit in any quantitative manner. In other 
words, while the comparative use of international law has occurred in 
extremely contentious and highly visible cases, the total sample of recent cases 
where the Court has called upon international law as persuasive authority is 
quite small.210 Moreover, in those select instances when the Court has opined 
on a constitutional provision by seeking insight from materials originating 
outside the United States, those materials have overwhelmingly been from 
foreign individual states, rather than international law.211 In fact, most often, 
international law is given an undifferentiated and uncontextualized treatment 
 
 206 See, e.g., Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 2; see also Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra note 13, 
at 361–87. 
 207 See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Globalization in the Service of Self-Government, 20 ETHICS & 
INT’L AFF. 477, 478 (2006). 
 208 Ginsburg, supra note 140, at 1, 8; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond our Borders: The 
Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 329 
(2004). 
 209 See Elizabeth Greathouse, Justices See Joint Issues with the EU, WASH. POST, July 9, 1998, at A24. 
 210 See generally Mark V. Tushnet, Referring to Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: An 
Episode in the Culture Wars, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 299 (2006) (outlining the limited use of international and 
foreign law in Supreme Court opinions). 
 211 E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005) (pointing out that the United States is the only 
country that gives official sanction to the juvenile death penalty, making several comparisons to foreign and 
international law); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 815, 830 n.34 (1988) (referring to Anglo-American 
and Western European legal traditions, in deciding a death-penalty appeal while only referencing international 
law in a footnote). 
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by being thrown in with foreign domestic law.212 Thus, from within the small 
sample of cases that do persuasively rely on foreign and international law, the 
international law component represents a minority within a minority. Bradley 
has remarked that “[t]he Court has treated . . . international materials as 
evidence that may be relevant to the interpretation of vague or uncertain 
constitutional provisions.”213 This observation, while necessarily accurate, 
does not go very far in explaining either the normative foundation of such use, 
or a methodological grounding in this context. As is discussed below, the 
inability to make more profound generalizations about the Court’s current use 
of international law as a constitutional interpretative aid is more a result of the 
Court’s rather ad hoc approach, then a failure of the commentators to spot a 
substantial theoretical trend. 
A. Eighth Amendment Cases 
Probably the most frequent use of international law as persuasive authority 
comes within the ambit of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. This is because, 
from the dawn of modern cruel-and-unusual-punishment doctrine, “[t]he 
climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular 
punishment” has been a “not irrelevant” part of the analysis.214 Indeed, the 
Court has repeatedly noted that that it has “recognized the relevance of the 
views of the international community” to determine whether a particular form 
of punishment comports with the contemporary understanding of the Eighth 
Amendment.215 This foray into the realm of non-U.S. authority stems from the 
framing of the analysis of Eighth Amendment claims which are evaluated with 
an eye to “evolving standards of decency” that are the hallmarks of “a 
maturing society.”216 As such, the Court has continuously opined that such 
standards take into account international opinion and therefore, by “society,” it 
is intended “all humanity” rather than a more insular American outlook. 
From that vantage point, several modern cases interpreting the confines of 
the Eighth Amendment reference international materials—albeit most do so 
 
 212 See BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 6–7 (2001) (arguing that international law should be seen as a 
separate and distinct legal system, and that the myth that international law can be grouped with domestic law 
in a given state should be dispelled). 
 213 Curtis A. Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 
59, 93. 
 214 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 
n.10 (1977)). 
 215 See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958)). 
 216 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
GLENSY GALLEYSFINAL 6/28/2011  9:54 AM 
238 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25 
without much contextualizing and so scantily that but for scathing dissents that 
draw attention to them, they would hardly be noticed. Thus, in Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, where the Court ruled that the death penalty was an 
unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to persons who 
were under the age of sixteen when they perpetrated their crime, the Court, in a 
footnote, noted that “three major human rights treaties explicitly prohibit 
juvenile death penalties.”217 The three treaties that the Court then referred to 
were the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),218 
the American Convention on Human Rights,219 and the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civil Persons in Time of War.220 
The only analysis by the Court, if it can be characterized as such, in citing 
these treaties was to note whether they were signed or ratified by the United 
States, and to characterize them as “major.” Both of these considerations are 
the tips of the iceberg of very important methodological approaches to the 
persuasive use of international law within the context of constitutional 
interpretation and offer tiny snippets into the Court’s thinking on the matter. 
However, only a psychic can truly know what the Court was attempting to 
convey with the notations of signing or ratification of the treaties and their 
description as “major.” Nevertheless, the notion of some form of imprimatur 
by the United States of an international treaty relates to the expressed opinion 
of some part of the U.S. government of which the Court should take 
account.221 The identification of the three treaties as “major” is presumptively 
an attempt to encapsulate in one word the notion that these treaties represent a 
wide consensus within the international community and therefore portray a 
positive established norm.222 
In the next case to tackle the juvenile death penalty, this time as applied to 
those who had committed their crime under the age of eighteen, the Court 
reached the opposite conclusion—such sentences were constitutional. In 
Stanford v. Kentucky,223 it was primarily the dissent that drew on international 
 
 217 See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831 n.34. 
 218 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(5), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 
1966 U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 
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 219 American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
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1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 221 This aspect will be discussed in further detail in Part IV.B.3, infra. 
 222 This aspect will be discussed in further detail in Part IV.B.2, infra. 
 223 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
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materials in its attempt to buttress the majority’s argument. In fact, the dissent 
reiterated almost verbatim the illustrative footnote of Thompson by stating that 
“In addition to national laws, three leading human rights treaties ratified or 
signed by the United States explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties.”224 In 
addition to the three treaties identified by Thompson, the Stanford dissent also 
added a resolution to the same effect that had been passed by the UN 
Economic and Social Council, endorsed by the General Assembly of the UN, 
and adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders.225 Although the Court, as it usually 
does in these circumstances, offered no contextual reasoning for why it was 
calling upon that particular source of international law, the addition of the 
resolution is particularly interesting. This is because the resolution is not a 
treaty, nor does it arguably rise to the level of customary law, and therefore 
represents an example of international law of the soft law variety. Its 
interpolation in the dissent’s opinion might indicate that the prohibition on 
sentencing juveniles to death, while not necessarily an established norm of 
international law, is an emerging global norm to which the United States 
should subscribe.226 
The most recent expostulations on the applicability of the Eighth 
Amendment to two different types of punishments also contain the most 
developed uses of international law as applied to juveniles.227 In Roper v. 
Simmons, the Court overruled Stanford and declared that the execution of 
individuals who had committed their crimes under the age of eighteen was an 
unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment.228 In a section devoted 
entirely to the persuasive use of foreign and international law, the majority 
opinion cited favorably the same treaties identified in the Thompson majority 
 
 224 Id. at 389–90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 225 See id. at 390 n.10 (noting that the resolution included the safeguard that “[p]ersons below 18 years of 
age at the time of the commission of the crime shall not be sentenced to death”). 
 226 This aspect will be discussed in further detail in Part IV.B.2, infra. 
 227 Between Stanford and the two next cases about to be discussed, there were other examples of the use 
of international law similar in quantity and quality to those illustrated in Thompson and Stanford. In Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), relying in part on international authority, the Court ruled that it was 
unconstitutional to execute a person who was mentally challenged. Id. at 321. And in Knight v. Florida, 528 
U.S. 990 (1999) (denying petition for certiorari), Justice Breyer dissented from the denial of certiorari in a case 
which presented the issue of whether a long delay between sentencing a person to death, and the execution of 
that sentence, constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 993 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). In arguing that the Court should review the case on its merits, Justice Breyer referenced the 
United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. See id. at 994. 
 228 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574, 579 (2005). 
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and Stanford dissent and added to them the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.229 
The separate dissent authored by Justice O’Connor is noteworthy because, 
notwithstanding the fact that she disagreed with the outcome reached by the 
majority, she wrote separately from the other dissenters to confirm that foreign 
and international law have a role in Eighth Amendment analysis, because the 
inquiry required in this context “reflects the special character of the Eighth 
Amendment, which, as the Court has long held, draws its meaning directly 
from the maturing values of civilized society.”230 Justice Scalia’s dissent 
reiterates his usual creed against using international law to interpret any part of 
the U.S. Constitution, but is very interesting for its prescience.231 In referring 
to the majority’s use of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Justice 
Scalia noted that the treaty “prohibits punishing [children] with life in prison 
without the possibility of release,” and added that “get[ting] in line with the 
international community” would surely mean adopting that section of the 
treaty as well—a proposition that Justice Scalia characterized as giving “little 
comfort.”232 
Justice Scalia’s prediction was of an accuracy that would have made 
Nostradamus proud. Merely five years after the decision in Roper, the Court 
decided Graham v. Florida, and held that the punishment of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole for juveniles who had not committed murder 
was an unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment.233 The majority 
cited exactly the same article of the same treaty that Justice Scalia had 
identified five years earlier, stating that this treaty prohibited the imposition of 
“life imprisonment without possibility of release . . . for offences committed by 
persons below eighteen years of age.”234 Even though the majority noted that 
there was “no international legal agreement that is binding on the United 
States,” that prohibited “life without parole for juvenile offenders,” it went on 
to assert that such a fact missed the mark because the inquiry is not about the 
binding (or not binding) nature of international law, but rather whether the 
 
 229 See id. at 575–77; see also Organization of African Unity, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child, entered into force Nov. 29, 1999, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49; Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 230 Roper, 543 U.S. at 604–05 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 231 See id. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 232 Id. at 623. Justice Scalia also consulted international law in the negative by pointing out several 
examples of laws that were not consonant with the U.S. legal system, and thus decrying the supposed selective 
nature of the Court’s consultations with such law. See id. at 624–27. 
 233 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 234 Id. at 2034. 
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punishment being examined by the Court comports with its contemporary 
understanding of the Eighth Amendment.235 In the Graham case, such 
punishment did not. 
Taken together, Roper and Graham represent the high point of the use of 
international law as persuasive authority within the context of Eighth 
Amendment cruel-and-unusual punishment analysis. Both cases devote more 
length to the use of foreign and international authority than any of their 
predecessors (albeit the “foreign” part is significantly longer than the 
“international” part). And qualitatively, the analyses also reflect a deeper 
analytical focus than do many of the cases that also deploy this comparative 
methodology. Thus, both Roper and Graham offer a comprehensive 
introduction into the reasoning of the Court for embarking on its international 
voyage: that the United States is part of a community of nations in which it 
should share, from a normative standpoint, a certain commonality when it 
comes to how it treats its convicted criminals. Similarly, both cases do not 
select obscure notions of international doctrine, but well-known treaties that 
form the backbone of contemporary international law. Moreover, both cases 
reiterate the normative comparative ethos that international law is there to 
serve as a method of persuasion, and not one of forced compliance. 
B. Other Cases 
Before turning to the proposed framework for the selection of international 
law, it is worth examining two recent forays by the Supreme Court into the 
persuasive use of international law in cases that did not involve the Eighth 
Amendment. While, as noted above, the framing of modern Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence is a natural fit for the use of international law, other 
U.S. constitutional doctrines might not be so amenable to this interpretative 
methodology. Nevertheless, the Court throughout history has used 
international law to interpret other constitutional provisions, with a particular 
focus on the Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process clauses.236 This is 
because, like the standards announced for the Eighth Amendment, the Equal 
Protection and Substantive Due Process clauses embody norms such as 
 
 235 Id. Justice Thomas, in dissent, confined his rejection of the use of international law in this context to a 
footnote noting correctly that his objection to this practice had been adequately explained in previous cases 
delineating the contours of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 2053 n.12 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 236 See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 n.3 (1937) (looking to status of compulsory self-
incrimination in continental Europe); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 n.1 (1908) (looking to European 
labor laws in post-Lochner Due Process case). 
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fairness and liberty “that transcend[] borders,” and therefore lend themselves to 
a certain universality of approach.237 Indeed, Substantive Due Process analysis 
tracks somewhat that of the Eighth Amendment by seeking to protect those 
practices that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”238 Justice Scalia, 
albeit mockingly and disapprovingly, made a similar point when attempting to 
counter Justice O’Connor’s approval of the use of international law within the 
context of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that she characterized as having a 
“distinctive character” that made it especially adept to the use of such non-U.S. 
authority, by noting that “[n]othing in the text [of the Eighth Amendment] 
reflects such a distinctive character—and [the Court has] certainly applied the 
‘maturing values’ rationale to give brave new meaning to other provisions of 
the Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause.”239 Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s yearning for the jettison of 
“maturing values” jurisprudence that links the Eighth Amendment to the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, it does not appear that the Court is intent on 
abandoning this form of analysis at least within these specific constitutional 
contexts. 
The most recent persuasive reliance on international law in the context of 
an equal protection case came in Grutter v. Bollinger,240 where the Court 
upheld The University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action 
program.241 In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg noted that the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women both supported the proposition that affirmative action programs are 
remedial in nature and must be reviewed periodically so that they can be 
phased out once the goals of equality have been fulfilled.242 No real reason for 
the consultation with these two international treaties was given, nor was any 
qualification other than the notation that the first of these two treaties was 
ratified by the United States. 
A fuller use of international law occurred in Lawrence v. Texas.243 In 
Lawrence, the Court invalidated a Texas statute that criminalized the sexual 
 
 237 See Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra note 13, at 382. 
 238 Palko, 302 U.S. at 325. 
 239 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 n.9 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 240 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 241 Id. at 343. 
 242 See id. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 243 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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conduct of two consenting adults of the same sex as being an unconstitutional 
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.244 The 
international law references came in rebuttal to the arguments made in the case 
Lawrence was overruling, Bowers v. Hardwick,245 where Chief Justice Burger, 
in a concurrence, noted that sodomy was universally condemned and 
criminalized in all Judeo-Christian Western civilizations.246 Justice Kennedy, 
in Lawrence, drew on international law to debunk Chief Justice Burger’s 
claim, in Bowers, specifically by noting that a case decided by the European 
Court of Human Rights five full years before Bowers, which presented the 
identical legal question as Bowers, had reached the exact opposite result of that 
which Chief Justice Burger declaimed, to universal approval.247 
While Justice Ginsburg in Grutter provides only a scintilla of context to her 
citation of international authority, Justice Kennedy gives us substantial insight 
into the motivation behind his citations to non-U.S. opinions. In Lawrence, 
international law (of the regional law variety) provided a communing function 
of linking the U.S. Constitution to the European Convention of Human Rights 
as well as a counter to the obviously erroneous arguments uttered by Chief 
Justice Burger in Bowers.248 For the Lawrence majority, it was not enough to 
merely rule in favor of the petitioners, but they had to clarify that Bowers was 
being unceremoniously dumped as a colossal error from its inception.249 This 
could not be clearer in the words of Justice Kennedy: “Bowers was not correct 
when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”250 International law was thus 
used as a universal battering ram to demonstrate the magnitude of Bowers’s 
error. 
Notwithstanding the clear motivation of the use of international law in 
some of the cases illustrated above, there are key aspects of the use of 
international law exhibited in the Eighth Amendment, the Equal Protection, 
and Substantive Due Process contexts that raise more questions than answers. 
First, what is the point in noting frequently whether the United States has 
 
 244 Id. at 578–79. 
 245 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 246 Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 247 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (“[T]he decision [of the European Court of Human Rights] is at odds 
with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.”). 
 248 Id. at 576–77 (citing European Court of Human Rights decisions rejecting Bowers and stating that the 
right of homosexuals to engage “in intimate, consensual conduct” is an “integral part of human freedom”). 
 249 Id. at 576 (“In the United States criticism of Bowers has been substantial and continuing, disapproving 
of its reasoning in all respects . . . .”). 
 250 Id. at 578. 
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signed or ratified a particular treaty to which the Court is referring? Does 
failure of the United States to ratify a treaty signal a dereliction of the duty of 
the United States that the Court should rectify or does it convey the exact 
opposite—that the United States purposely seeks to oppose the substance of 
that treaty? Second, why is it important for the Court to predominantly refer to 
international law that is encapsulated in large well-known multilateral treaties? 
Is it to convince itself of the sound policy grounding of such law (thus 
implying that international law of a murkier provenance might not be 
perceived as persuasive enough) or is the Court more concerned with 
highlighting the perceived universality of the same? And last, is the Court’s 
use of international law to be implied as occurring within a framework of 
repeated interactions—in other words, as part of an ongoing worldwide process 
of customary international law formation? These are the questions (and some 
others) that a methodological theory for the use of international law must 
answer. 
IV.  A FRAMEWORK FOR THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
One thing that can be glimpsed from the Court’s use of international law as 
persuasive authority is that such use is usually called upon in what most 
commentators would characterize as “big” cases. This observation might not 
be as flip as it sounds because one theory could be that the more important and 
far-reaching from a constitutional, theoretical, and practical perspective the 
outcome might be, the more vital it becomes to consult as much relevant 
persuasive authority as is necessary to be assured of a correct result. Justice 
Kennedy hinted at such reasoning in Lawrence when he justified consultation 
to international materials by noting that the issue in that case involved “values 
[that are] share[d] with a wider civilization.”251 
But a methodological theory based on the relative importance of a 
particular case seems at best haphazard, and at worst self-serving. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist emphasized both of these notions observing that in a whole slew of 
cases where the Court cited international law to interpret the U.S. Constitution, 
it had “offered no explanation for its own citation[s]” and therefore this lacuna 
cast a serious doubt about the whole enterprise that he suggested ought to be 
abandoned outright.252 Clearly, something else is required to give a sounder 
 
 251 Id. at 576. 
 252 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 325 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The majority opinion held 
that the imposition of the death penalty on those who were mentally challenged was an unconstitutional 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 321 (majority opinion). 
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normative and methodological strength to this endeavor that can be of service 
to the members of the high court. After all, when all is said and done about the 
use of international law, “the task of interpreting [constitutional provisions] 
remains [the Court’s] responsibility.”253 
A. A Note on Foreign Law 
It bears repeating that international law is clearly not the only repository of 
non-U.S. law that can function as an aid to U.S. constitutional interpretation. 
Foreign law, being the domestic law of other countries, can and does function 
in a similar role as international law. Indeed, as noted above, the Court cites to 
both sources seemingly interchangeably and citations to foreign law are 
substantially more frequent and detailed than those to international law—the 
latter, in most circumstances, ostensibly appearing as afterthoughts. In other 
words, foreign and international law are not usually selected nor treated 
independently of one another within the context of constitutional 
interpretation.254 But foreign domestic law is inherently different from 
international law and its structural differences should, from both a normative 
and practical perspective, be treated differently than international law. These 
differences ought to be reflected not only in the motivations that go into 
whether such law should be selected,255 but also how that particular law is 
selected. 
In a previous article, this Author approached the question of methodology 
of selection as applied to foreign law only. In it, this Author identified three 
criteria that courts should take into consideration when seeking to consult 
foreign law in the context of domestic constitutional adjudication: (1) the 
democratic credentials of the nation from which the law is being sought with a 
marked preference for those nations whose law is processed from a system of 
 
 253 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
 254 That is not to say that other parties have not already urged the Court to find a purposeful link between 
the foreign law and the international law it cites. For example, in its amicus brief filed in support of the 
petitioners in Lawrence, Amnesty International noted that both foreign law and international law were 
perfectly integrated on the matter of the criminalization of consensual adult same-sex activities. See Brief for 
Mary Robinson of Amnesty International et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02–102), 2003 WL 164151, at *12–13 (specifying that the South African 
Constitutional Court, the European Court of Human Rights, and the UN Human Rights Committee all had 
reached a common understanding of privacy rights that encompassed the idea of non-interference into the 
sexual practices of same-sex consulting adults). 
 255 See, e.g., Glensy, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 13, at 1178 (discussing the considerations 
that should cause foreign law and international law to be treated differently within the context of constitutional 
adjudication). 
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checks and balances that owes its ultimate source of legitimacy to the people; 
(2) the societal character and culture of the nation from where the proposed 
law is coming with an eye towards spotting those embedded socio-cultural 
features that create a commonality between that nation and the United States; 
and (3) the specific context of the case where the inquiry is into the nature of 
the doctrine being examined by the Court and whether it shares characteristics 
that transcend national borders.256 
While the above criteria prove workable and very effective in identifying 
countries from where law can be consulted as persuasive authority as an aid to 
U.S. constitutional interpretation,257 they prove less useful within the context 
of international law. The reasons for this are multiple. First, it is difficult to 
evaluate the process of production of international law from a democratic 
perspective. There are certain characteristics of international law that appear 
democratic, but others are decisively not. On the more democratic side are 
notions that international bodies that promulgate international law only enact 
such rules when a majority or supermajority of nations agree. Similarly, the 
process of production of the basic forms of international law are superficially 
democratic in that bilateral or multilateral treaties are only entered into by 
consent of the participant nations without coercion, and customary 
international law is democratic in the sense that it requires a quasi-unanimous 
organic adherence before a rule ripens into binding status. 
However, on the other side of the equation is the fact that not all of the 
process of international lawmaking is democratic. Even though international 
law is premised on a notion of juridical equality of all nations,258 in practice, 
this is a fallacy. For example, the UN Security Council (the chief executive 
lawmaking body of the UN) functions on an extremely undemocratic model 
where five nations (who are permanent members of the fifteen nation body) 
each possess a veto right on any action that the Council could take.259 The UN 
General Assembly, putatively more democratic, passes resolutions that are 
 
 256 See Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra note 13, at 361. 
 257 The criteria do not ignore countries that have a particular outlying jurisprudence in particular areas of 
the law for specific historical or cultural reasons. Thus, the German restrictions on Nazi symbols and abortion 
must be viewed in light of the wild abuses of human rights carried out by the Third Reich; the tradition of 
French secularism must be appreciated in light of the causes of its revolution; the goal of total egalitarianism in 
democratic South Africa is a response to the vile apartheid regime that preceded the current constitutional 
structure; and the treatment of indigenous people in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all 
reflect the specific historical relationships between the native populations and the respective governments. 
 258 BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 52. 
 259 U.N. Charter arts. 23, 27. 
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non-binding at their inception but that could ripen into customary international 
law, but it is not truly democratic in the sense that China and India (with well 
more than one billion people each) have the same number of votes as countries 
such as Vanuatu or Tuvalu (Pacific atolls with only tens of thousands of 
people).260 Moreover, many international bodies with law making capabilities 
are comprised of countries that have no democratic credentials themselves.261 
Indeed, it is rare to have international bodies whose total membership are 
committed to democratic governance such as the European Court of Human 
Rights—“a body that derives its authority and jurisdiction via the consent of 
nations, all of which exhibit democratic characteristics.”262 Nevertheless, 
regardless of the composition of international bodies and their members’ lack 
of adherence to democratic principles, the promulgation of international law 
from these sources is valid as is the substance of those rules. Therefore, unlike 
foreign law, an examination of democratic credentials does not yield anything 
useful to a court seeking to use international law as a source of persuasive 
authority. 
Socio-cultural commonalities are equally not useful when searching for 
appropriate international law to use as an aid to constitutional interpretation. 
While international law might be said to reflect a certain legal culture 
(although legal culture is only part of the composite of elements that 
constitutes the totality of a nation’s “culture”),263 it is difficult to conceive what 
kind of society international law represents, if any.264 Therefore, aside from the 
specific context of the case (which is a factor equally applicable to foreign law 
and international law)265 the other two criteria offered for selection of foreign 
law do not apply to international law. Hence, different parameters should 
provide the adequate policy considerations that will form the basis of sound 
methodological selection factors. 
 
 260 See id. art. 18. 
 261 For example, the Economist Intelligence Unit has created an index of democracy, assigning states 
values which reflect “the state of democracy worldwide.” Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 
2010, THE ECONOMIST, 1 (Dec. 15, 2010), http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf. The 
values range from zero to ten with a higher score reflecting a more democratic state. Three notable world 
players scored quite low: North Korea (1.08), Saudi Arabia (1.84), and Iran (1.94). Id. at 7–8. All of these 
countries are members of the World Health Organization. Countries, WHO, http://www.who.int/ 
countries/en (last visited May 2, 2011). 
 262 Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra note 13, at 444. 
 263 See id. at 422–24 (analyzing the many component parts of different cultures). 
 264 Here the concept of “society” is descriptive of present reality rather than normative. 
 265 See, e.g., Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra note 13, at 433–36 (justifying the use of case-
specific context in a determination of applicable foreign and international law sources). 
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B. The Three-Pronged Analysis 
Consultation with international law has been, in one form or another, part 
of the fabric of constitutional interpretation in the United States almost since 
its naissance. As noted by Justice Breyer, the United States is “a Nation that 
from its birth has given a ‘decent respect to the opinions of mankind.’”266 
Chief Justice John Jay saw these references to the law of nations (as 
international law was known at the time) as a way for the United States to give 
itself legitimacy as a newly formed nation. He noted “the United States . . . by 
taking a place among the nations of the earth, bec[a]me amenable to the laws 
of nations.”267 The role that international law took in the early years of the 
Court’s jurisprudence was to function as an advisory backdrop against which 
U.S. decisions had to be squared and reconciled, whenever possible. Thus, “the 
laws of the United States ought not, if it be avoidable . . . be construed as to 
infract the common principles and usages of nations.”268 As concisely and 
famously expressed by Chief Justice John Marshall, “an act of [C]ongress 
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction” exists.269 
While these iterations of the use of international law served a very valid 
purpose for the time in which they occurred, they cannot form the basis for a 
theory-based methodology for the selection of international law as persuasive 
authority. The main reason for this is that the early Court’s proposed role for 
international law was completely undifferentiated—that is it was not context 
specific, but merely a blanket judicial norm of which the Court, over time, 
became barely conscious.270 But a reasoned methodology cannot exist in the 
nether recesses of the judicial mind; rather, it must live in the foreground so 
there is a cognizance about how it should operate and the possibility of 
purposely adapting it to changing situations and circumstances. When coupling 
these considerations with a plausible germinating theory a coherent 
methodology can emerge. 
 
 266 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (denying petition for certiorari). 
 267 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793). 
 268 Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801). 
 269 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 270 After all, rhetorically speaking, how many cases that the Court has decided since Schooner Charming 
Betsy explicitly test the notion whether a particular statutory or constitutional construction comports with, or 
deviates from, prevalent international law? 
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1. International Dimension of the Problem 
It is an axiom that international law deals with cross-border affairs. Thus it 
comes as no surprise that there are vast bodies of international law in all forms 
dealing with topics such as foreign relations, the law of the seas, the 
conventions of war and the treatment of prisoners, and trade and tariff rules. 
But, as noted above, international law in the last sixty years has addressed 
more than extra-national matters but has increasingly concerned the 
relationships that a state has with its own citizens within its own borders. 
Moreover, even within traditional areas of international law, such as the 
substance of the various rights that foreign citizens enjoy when located in a 
country of which they are not nationals, norms of casual compliance by the 
host state are giving way to more stringent methods of enforcement so that the 
impact of international law is felt even in situations where only one sovereign 
nation is involved. In summary, the subject matter of international law has 
become more pervasive and has infiltrated legal issues which, until recently, 
have not had much to do with international law. 
Notwithstanding the fact that international law has increased in scope, there 
are clearly areas of the law it has not reached yet. As a general matter, there are 
many administrative, structural, and procedural legal aspects about which 
international law has very little, if anything, to say. So, for example, 
international law might be silent as to what type of a challenge a welfare 
recipient should be entitled before having her subsidies curtailed by the state, 
or there might be nothing in international law that dictates what nutritional 
information should be printed on food products, or the jurisdictional overlaps 
inherent in a federal system of government might not appear in the annals of 
any repository of international law. The fact that international law might speak 
loudly to certain subjects but whisper or be mute about others leads to part of 
the first consideration that a court seeking to use international law as 
persuasive authority to aid in constitutional interpretation should contemplate: 
that the problem being presented in the case at hand have some sort of 
international dimension to it. In other words, the issue presented to the court 
must be of a subject matter that international law covers in some way. This 
might seem an obvious exhortation, but in certain past cases where the 
Supreme Court consulted international law, there seemed to be no apparent 
international connection to the issue being litigated. 
However, this is not the end of the equation vis-à-vis the international 
dimension of the problem. There is a second part that might not seem as self-
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evident as consulting international law only in those instances where the 
subject matter of the controversy is covered by the substantive rules of 
international law. The second part of this consideration must account for the 
potential international impact of the decision to be taken by the court. This 
should be consonant not only with the issue under review, but also with the 
normative goals of the comparative enterprise illustrated in Part III above. As 
such, any court that tasks itself with consulting international law as persuasive 
authority to interpret the U.S. Constitution should only do so after an inquiry 
into the international ramifications of its decision. 
It should be noted that consultation with international materials in these 
instances does not have to lead to a result that conforms with prevalent 
international law norms if these norms conflict in an obvious way with the U.S. 
Constitution. As noted by Justice Scalia, “[T]he basic premise . . . that 
American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be 
rejected out of hand.”271 As a general rule, Justice Scalia is correct, but of 
course the suggestion made by proponents of the persuasive use of 
international law is not that international law should be consulted so that 
American law can be “conformed” to it, but rather so that any conclusions 
reached by the court can be “confirmed” by this body of law. As noted very 
recently by Justice Kennedy, the idea that there is an “international consensus” 
regarding a particular rule of law to which the United States should be bound 
“miss[es] the mark” because the inquiry into the substance of international law 
is to provide for “respected and significant confirmation” of the Court’s 
conclusions.272 
The notion that a court should examine the international impact of its 
decisions when referring to international law in the context of constitutional 
interpretation is not a novelty within Supreme Court jurisprudence. Several 
doctrines currently employed by the Supreme Court embody this ethos of 
awareness of international ramifications. Most important of these is comity.273 
Comity is a concept mostly pertinent to private international law cases. Comity 
is defined as:  
[N]either a matter of absolute obligation . . . nor of mere courtesy and 
good will . . . . [b]ut it is the recognition which one nation allows 
 
 271 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia did not distinguish 
between international law and foreign law in his exhortation. 
 272 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572). 
 273 Other doctrines that exhibit the same characteristics are the act of state doctrine and the dormant 
foreign relations preemption doctrine. See Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra note 13, at 394. 
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within its territory to the . . . acts of another nation, having due regard 
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its 
own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its 
laws.274  
Therefore, comity owes its grounding in a reciprocal norm that forms the root 
of many policies underlying the comparative enterprise. Indeed, comity is 
often invoked in cases “in the correct adjudication of which foreign nations are 
deeply interested . . . [and] in which the principles of the law . . . of nations 
often form[s] an essential inquiry.”275 Thus, comity represents “the basis of 
international law, a rule of international law, a synonym for private 
international law . . . goodwill between sovereigns . . . reciprocity, or 
‘considerations of high international politics concerned with maintaining 
amicable and workable relationships between nations.’”276 
In keeping precepts of comity in mind when deciding cases, the Court 
adopts the pragmatist notion on which comity is based. Possibly of even more 
importance, the force of comity, like that of international law within the 
context of constitutional adjudication, is not one of obligation, but rather one 
of counsel.277 Thus, the motivations that lead courts to justify reliance on 
notions of comity are similar to those used to justify reliance on international 
law within the context of constitutional interpretation. That is not to say that 
courts are uniform in their interpretation of the scope of comity. Some courts 
have used comity as a nominal starting point of their analysis, only to be 
discarded if counteracting policy considerations counsel against its application 
in that particular instance.278 Other courts have given the policy more teeth by 
noting that it will be employed to avoid retaliatory action in kind by a foreign 
state.279 Regardless of the particular treatment that comity is given in a specific 
 
 274 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895); see also Burley, supra note 191, at 1948 (defining 
comity as “a principle grounded not on courtesy but on a conception of the transnational rule of law”). 
 275 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816). 
 276 Paul, supra note 192, at 3–4 (footnotes omitted). 
 277 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163–64 (stating that comity is neither absolute obligation, nor mere courtesy); see 
also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797–98 (1993) (holding that comity would not counsel 
against exercising jurisdiction in an action affecting foreign insurers for violations of the Sherman Act). 
 278 See, e.g., Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 428–30 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(upholding the injunction of foreign proceedings on the ground of putative incompetence of the foreign body 
notwithstanding contrary policy considerations supported by comity); Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 
624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996) (refusing to require district courts “to genuflect before a vague and omnipotent notion 
of comity” when issuing anti-suit injunctions against foreign proceedings). 
 279 See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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case, the point is that courts are adept in exploring the international 
ramifications of a legal decision. 
The possible international implications of the Court’s decisions have 
played a major role in significant constitutional law cases where international 
law served as a persuasive source of law (whether the Court majority decided 
to adhere to it or not).280 Of utmost import is United States v. Alvarez-
Machain,281 where the Court decided that federal courts had jurisdiction to try 
a Mexican national who had been kidnapped and tendered to the United States 
by American law enforcement officers.282 The dissent, although rooting its 
argument in the proper interpretation of the Mexican-American extradition 
treaty, expressed grave concern regarding the effect that the Court’s majority 
opinion would have across the border.283 In very strong words, Justice Stevens 
concluded that he suspected that “most courts throughout the civilized  
world . . . [would] be deeply disturbed by the ‘monstrous’ decision the Court 
announce[d]. . . . For every nation that has an interest in preserving the Rule of 
Law is affected . . . by a decision of this character.”284 
The dissent in Alvarez-Machain is noteworthy. The most important reason 
for this is the fact that Justice Stevens derives the normative strength of his 
argument not from the U.S. government’s breach of the Mexican-American 
extradition treaty (which was irrefutable) but instead from the potential parade 
of international horrors that he envisages should the Court ratify the act of 
banditry at issue in the case.285 After all, how happy would U.S. officials be if 
foreign undercover government agents were to kidnap an American national in 
the United States, shuttle him abroad, and then try him in a foreign land? Thus, 
by examining the impact on other countries of the Court’s decision, Justice 
Stevens squarely reconciled the legal argument with its practical implications 
 
 280 A series of cases in which international ramifications played an important role in the arguments and 
decisions of the various courts that opined on the matter were related to U.S. states’ continual violation of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which mandates that signatory nations notify a person undergoing 
arrest procedures as quickly as is feasible of her right to assistance from her consulate. MICHAEL J. GARCIA, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32390, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS: OVERVIEW OF U.S. 
IMPLEMENTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE INTERPRETATION OF CONSULAR NOTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENTS 3–10 (2004). Because these cases address, at least in part, matters that are properly of binding 
international law and its impact on the U.S. constitutional system, they are only tangentially relevant to the 
discussion at hand. Id. at 6. 
 281 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). 
 282 Id. at 657. 
 283 Id. at 687–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
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and exhorted the Court to factor this latter variable into its decision. The 
international ramifications adduced in Alvarez-Machain were a natural 
outgrowth of the particular type of claim that was litigated in that case. In other 
words, some types of cases inherently lend themselves quite organically to the 
consultation of international law. But not all cases that present international 
ramifications can emerge even in cases that are, strictly speaking, purely 
domestic and therefore extrinsic to the specific issue being disputed. For 
example, a case presenting a constitutional issue stemming from a criminal 
conviction might have international reach if the criminal defendant is a foreign 
national, or if the possible sentence to be meted out in that case violates certain 
international norms that might form the basis of a retaliatory action by 
countries supporting such norms.286 Similarly, international ramifications 
might result from a case presenting purely a domestic issue of law but where 
the most noteworthy and influential precedent is international and courts all 
around the world are following that international precedent.287 These 
illustrations represent only the tip of the iceberg of situations that might arise 
that could trigger a constitutional law issue, the resolution of which may well 
ripple beyond the U.S. border. 
In summary, the first step that a court should undertake when deciding 
whether to consult with international law as an aid to constitutional 
interpretation is to determine whether the problem has an international 
dimension. This is a two-step analysis: first, and rather obviously, the court 
should ascertain whether the subject matter of the dispute is of the nature to 
which international law speaks. In a second and more complex step, the court 
should determine whether the consequences of the decision reached have any 
international ramifications. As illustrated above, the Court is familiar with the 
latter inquiry that forms the part of various doctrines that often come up in its 
jurisprudence—comity being the most important example. Once this threshold 
 
 286 An example of this is the European Union rule that refuses extradition of any person to a country 
where that person could be subjected to the death penalty. Agreement on Extradition Between the European 
Union and the United States of America, U.S.–E.U., art. 13, July 19, 2003, S. TREATY DOC. No. 109-14 
(2006). Of course, this does not mean that a U.S. court should declare the death penalty unconstitutional 
because of the European Union rule, but merely that it should be cognizant that the resolution of a specific 
case might impact these international norms. 
 287 This was the case in Lawrence, where the Dudgeon decision rendered by the European Court of 
Human Rights, characterized as “the world’s most influential human rights court,” was contrary to U.S. law, 
and it was that U.S. law that was being rejected world over, creating not negligible reputational problems for 
the United States in international settings. See Brief for Mary Robinson, Amnesty International et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02–102), 2003 WL 164151, at 
*10–11. 
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inquiry is made, the Court should consider two other elements to determine the 
appropriateness of relying on a particular rule of international law. 
2. Status of Law 
Like domestic law, international law is constantly undergoing births, 
deaths, rebirths, transformations, and mutations of all shapes and sizes. There 
has been, and continues to be, a very vigorous debate amongst international 
tribunals, organizations, institutions, scholars, governments, lawyers, and 
activists about the substantive content of international law and its scope, reach, 
and enforcement both on a transnational and domestic level.288 As with many 
similar debates, there are major areas of agreement around which a large 
majority of the various players in the international system have coalesced, but 
there are major areas of disagreement around which, at least for the present, 
there is a lack of unity. The areas of agreement and disagreement can be of 
various sorts; so, for example, the international community might concur that 
certain rules that began as mere custom have now ripened into binding 
customary international law, or there might be considerable unresolved debate 
about the enforcement mechanisms to be deployed against a state that has 
signed and ratified, but then violated, an important multilateral treaty. To 
synthesize, international law is in a constant state of flux and contest, and a 
court that seeks to use it as an aid to domestic constitutional interpretation must 
be aware of this fact. 
The fact that the substantive and procedural rules of international law are 
being constantly rewritten is an important consideration for courts to bear in 
mind when seeking to use international law persuasively. However, and more 
importantly, that knowledge must be supplemented by proper rules of 
recognition that are able to determine the status and force of a particular rule of 
international law. In other words, not all rules of international law have the 
same status, and an appreciation of which rules hold most (or least) sway 
should be a factor the court considers in determining how persuasive a rule of 
international law should be. From this perspective, it is possible to divide 
international law rules into three distinct categories, using as the dividing 
criteria the level of concordance about the existence and strength of these rules 
amongst the international community. Thus, the court seeking to use 
international law as persuasive authority should first ascertain whether that law 
 
 288 See BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 6–12. 
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reflects a settled norm of international law, a contested norm of international 
law, or an emerging norm of international law. 
Settled norms of international law represent those substantive rules that 
enjoy the highest level of support and adherence among players in the 
international system. Virtual unanimity (or, at the very least, an extremely high 
consensus) must exist between nations around the globe for an international 
norm to be considered “settled.”289 As a result of their almost unimpeachable 
status within the framework of international law, the use of settled norms 
within the ambit of constitutional interpretation would carry substantial weight 
and significant persuasive value. Here, the comparative policy being served is 
not conformity for conformity’s sake but it is instead a normative evaluation of 
the fact that there must be important motivations behind a position of 
international law that nations of diverse cultures and backgrounds have 
concluded deserve respect and universal compliance. Therefore, within the 
context of constitutional interpretation, settled norms of international law 
should be given an elevated level of persuasive effect. 
So how does a court identify that these international norms are settled 
(rather than contested or emerging) and thus universal? There are several 
possible avenues that one can take to conclude that an international norm is 
settled, and much will depend on how broadly one wants to define “settled.” 
Under the narrowest possible definition, settled norms of international law will 
correlate very closely to peremptory norms (jus cogens). As noted in Part II 
above, a peremptory norm is a fundamental tenet of international law that is 
approved by the international community of nations as a rule from which no 
waiver can ever be permitted. It bears reiterating that, while there is not much 
agreement as to which norms have reached that status or how they have done 
so, there is considerable agreement that norms such as the prohibition of 
slavery, genocide, piracy, and torture are all jus cogens.290 Taking the last as an 
example, a ban on torture can be validated as jus cogens by examining the 
numerous international treaties that ban it (among others, the Geneva 
Conventions291), the universal nature of such treaties (having been signed and 
ratified by almost every nation around the globe), the expressed opprobrium 
 
 289 Id. at 25. 
 290 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: ‘Jus Cogens’ and ‘Obligatio Erga Omnes,’ LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 63. 
 291 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
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against the practice by government officials of most countries, the absence of 
any accepted legal argument in opposition to its status as a peremptory norm, 
and the legal arguments made in cases where such a practice is imputed.292 
Moreover, judicial decisions have declared that torture “violates established 
norms of the international law of human rights”—a clear assertion of the 
existence of a settled international norm on the subject.293 
Under a broader definition of “settled norm,” other international rules could 
be classified as “settled” beyond the narrow categorization of jus cogens. Here, 
the examination is the same as that described in the paragraph above, but a 
finding of a peremptory norm would not be necessary to define a settled 
international norm. The normative reason for the broadened definition of 
“settled norm” is that the purpose for categorizing international rules as 
“settled” is different than the purpose of finding a particular international norm 
to be peremptory: in the first case, evidence of a norm being settled is used as a 
strong persuasive indicator of what the proper interpretation of a specific U.S. 
constitutional provision should be, while in the second case, the reason to find 
an international rule to be jus cogens is to bind nations to it without 
exception.294 Clearly, the threshold inquiry in the latter case should be far 
higher than in the former, because any findings within the context of 
constitutional interpretation are never binding onto U.S. courts. The type of 
issue before the court might function as an indicator as to the level of 
consensus international law should have before the court deems it valid enough 
for consultation. As stated by the Court, in cases pertaining to “the express 
affirmation of certain fundamental rights,” a settled norm of international law 
would “simply underscore[] the centrality of those same rights within our own 
heritage of freedom.”295 In these instances, international rules such as the 
prohibition on executing persons who committed crimes while juveniles should 
acquire the status of settled international norm for the same reasons given 
 
 292 For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia stated that torture is a 
peremptory international norm and all countries are mandated “to investigate, prosecute and punish” 
individuals accused of torture because “the torturer has become, like the pirate and the slave trader before him, 
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.” Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T at 55–56 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). 
 293 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 294 In his majority opinion in Graham, Justice Kennedy made this exact point by noting that whether a 
settled norm of international law is jus cogens or not is “of no import” because the strength of international law 
in the context of constitutional interpretation is not contingent on “those norms [being] binding” but on its 
ability to establish a denominator for “basic principles of decency.” Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 
(2010). 
 295 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005). 
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above for torture. In addition, even though the prohibition of the practice might 
not rise to the level of peremptory norm, its sheer unusualness in the 
international community contributes to the notion that it is something that the 
vast majority of the international community finds repugnant.296 
There does not seem to be much normative force to the argument that the 
U.S. Constitution should be interpreted in a way that is contrary to settled 
norms of international law, so long as the constitutional provision being 
examined can be rationally and reasonably interpreted to be consonant with 
such norms. Aside from the tired refrain of preservation of sovereignty uttered 
by critics of this sort of use of international law (which applies to the 
comparative enterprise across the board and not just to international law in 
particular), it is hard to imagine anyone seriously advocating that genocide or 
torture are somehow permitted by the U.S. Constitution.297 Settled 
international norms therefore represent the strongest iteration of international 
law and are most normatively persuasive within the context of constitutional 
interpretation.298 
On the other hand, contested norms represent the intermediate echelon of 
rules as they pertain to their level of observance and enforcement by the 
international community. Contested norms of international law are recognized 
and practiced by a significant majority or plurality of international actors but 
are nonetheless opposed by a non-negligible number within the various 
 
 296 This means that the determination that a practice violates a peremptory norm of international law, 
while instructive, is not critical to the determination of whether such practice is contrary to settled norms of 
international law. Thus, for example, in Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 62/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 (2002), the petitioner argued before the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights that his death sentence in Nevada for a crime that he committed when a juvenile 
should be overturned on the grounds that such a punishment contravened a peremptory norm of international 
law. Id. ¶ 113. Over the objections of the United States, the Commission agreed. See id. ¶ 115. Nevertheless, 
in Roper, when the U.S. Supreme Court declared those punishments as applied to juveniles unconstitutional 
under the Eighth Amendment, they did not do so on the ground that such punishments violated jus cogens (a 
fact that is still debatable notwithstanding the holding in Domingues) with which the United States would have 
to comply, but rather because of the persuasive weight of international law based on the reasoning that 
prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders had, by the time Roper was decided, become settled 
international law. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–79. 
 297 Disturbingly, Justice Scalia states that an international consensus on such matters can be shown to be 
unreasonable by contrary U.S. law. See id. at 627 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 298 In her dissent in Roper, Justice O’Connor implied that settled norms of international law found in 
treaties were the only rules that she was prepared to use as an aid for constitutional interpretation. See id. at 
605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In rejecting that international law advised against the execution of minors, 
Justice O’Conner noted that the congruence of domestic and international law that she was seeking ought to be 
only found in “clear agreement-expressed” forms. See id. 
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international regimes.299 Their status as “contested” stems from the fact that 
these norms are often the subject matter of heated debate in the international 
community—such debate being ongoing at the time that a court interpreting 
the U.S. Constitution calls upon them as a source of persuasive authority.300 
Therefore, in general terms, they should not carry as much persuasive weight 
as settled norms of international law. 
Clearly, there are superficially stronger arguments against the persuasive 
use of contested norms of international law than there are for a similar use of 
settled norms. Contested norms, by their nature, are not universally accepted 
by the international community; therefore, why should the United States utilize 
international norms of ambiguous provenance to interpret its own 
Constitution? The policies served by using contested norms of international 
law as persuasive authority are somewhat different than those applicable to a 
similar use of settled norms, but these policies are nonetheless important and 
carry a dual purpose. First, the United States, by domestically adopting a 
contested norm as a constitutional requirement, may signal to the rest of the 
world that it is taking a particular side in the contest. Because the opinion of 
the United States carries a lot of weight, by so acting, the United States could 
be seen as a norm entrepreneur and provide guidance to other nations (which 
might have been reticent up to that point to state their position), to adopt a 
similar rule. In this context, the United States is attempting to push a contested 
norm into the category of settled norm. Secondly, the signal sent by the United 
States in adopting the contested norm might also be expressive and associative 
in value. Under this reading, it would be valuable for the Court to engage in an 
inquiry into which nations had already expressed their favor for the contested 
norm. If these were nations with which there were commonalities of purpose, 
entering the fray on that particular side would express the desire of the United 
States to be counted as part of that side of the argument with all the 
reputational enhancements that might entail. 
The method of recognizing contested norms in many ways resembles that 
illustrated above for settled norms (whether peremptory or not). However, 
there are added circumstances that need to be examined for contested norms. In 
particular, the international law of regional organizations can be an area where 
contested norms of international law lie. Because the contest regarding the 
status of international law often pits one region of the world against another for 
 
 299 See BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 20. 
 300 See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
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social, cultural, and historical reasons, a simple analysis of the output of world 
bodies might overlook the important activity being conducted by regional 
institutions on this front. Similarly, contested norms of international law 
(unlike peremptory norms) might actually be part of international law that has 
not ripened yet into customary international law but is possibly quite close to 
doing so. Therefore, UN General Assembly resolutions and declarations, and 
international tribunal advisory opinions are useful places to detect the 
existence of a contested norm because the force of these documents is not 
binding at inception but can become so over time.301 
Examples of contested norms of international law can thus be found in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights is a UN General Assembly Resolution adopted in 1948.302 The UN 
General Assembly does not have authority to promulgate binding international 
norms; nevertheless, it is beyond dispute that several of the Universal 
Declaration’s substantive rules have taken on the status of peremptory 
norms.303 Indeed, the Universal Declaration created “an expectation of 
adherence, and insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State 
practice . . . may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding 
upon the States.”304 However, other of its substantive provisions have clearly 
not reached that plateau and are more aptly described as contested norms. For 
example, Article 12 protects the right to privacy, but this right is not accepted 
as universally binding, as many nations do not subscribe to its substantive 
essence.305 Similarly, Article 18 allows the freedom of religion that includes 
the right to change one’s religion, but this latter clause is clearly violated in 
many countries of the world through provisions for the crime of apostasy.306 In 
referring to either Article 12 or Article 18 as persuasive authority within the 
context of constitutional analysis, a court could not make the assertion that 
these norms are peremptory or even settled. However, the status of these norms 
as contested does not detract from their utility as persuasive authority because 
 
 301 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390 n.10 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting a UN 
Economic and Social Council resolution endorsed by the UN General Assembly). 
 302 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 33. 
 303 See id. art. 4 (prohibiting slavery); id. art. 5 (prohibiting torture). 
 304 Filartiga v. Pena–Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 305 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 33, art. 12. 
 306 Id. art. 18. 
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a further analysis of which countries subscribe to them and how they are 
interpreted could be of immense value for the reasons adduced above.307 
Lastly, emerging norms are the weakest international law rules when it 
comes to their recognition and acceptance.308 Only a plurality of nations could 
be said to agree with their status as international law, with a greater number of 
international players acting in opposition to them.309 Their status as emerging 
is an indication that these types of norms are in their Neolithic period of 
development on the international scene and are thus fighting an evolutionary 
battle to emerge from a proto-form of substantive rule into a more defined 
shape. The fact that these norms are in their infancy on the international scene 
does not mean that they are necessarily new on the domestic scene as well. 
Indeed, emerging norms of international law might have long and old roots in 
traditional domestic law. Thus, the fact that they are defined as “emerging” is a 
connotation solely applicable to their status as international law. 
Emerging norms of international law pose very interesting and vibrant 
normative questions when assessing their suitability to function as persuasive 
authority within the context of U.S. constitutional interpretation. Because their 
foundation as international law is the weakest, it would be easy to ignore them 
entirely. But engaging in judicial dialogue on emerging norms of international 
law might be a very effective way for the United States to exert its influence on 
the international scene and encourage other legal regimes to shape themselves 
in the United States’s image. Therefore, rather than attesting a congruence 
between emerging norms of international law and U.S. law, the process would 
be redirected outwards where a domestic statement of presence of an 
international law norm in its emerging state would provide the impetus to 
create or develop that particular norm. The process, of course, could also work 
in reverse where a U.S. judicial determination in the context of a constitutional 
 
 307 Interestingly, the recent UN General Assembly resolution calling for a moratorium on the death 
penalty likely falls in the bundle of contested norms of international law. See G.A. Res. 62/149, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/62/149 (Feb. 26, 2008). The resolution, which passed easily (105 votes in favor, 54 against, and 29 
abstentions), was the product of a coalition of European, Latin American, Oceanian, and some Sub-Saharan 
African countries and was opposed by North African, Middle-Eastern (except Israel), Asian, and Caribbean 
nations. Press Release, U.N. General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Landmark Text Calling for 
Moratorium on Death Penalty, U.N. Press Release GA/10678 (Dec. 18, 2007). The United States sided with 
the latter group, and it will be very interesting to track the development of this contested norm to see if it will 
influence any upcoming challenges in the realm of the Eighth Amendment in the future. Id. 
 308 See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf, (Ger. v. Den./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 46–56 (Feb. 20) 
(delineating a nation’s continental shelf by the principle of equidistance was not customary international law, 
because the majority of nations had not agreed to the principle). 
 309 See id. 
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argument that an emerging norm of international law does not in fact exist 
might significantly contribute to that norm’s extinction. In either circumstance, 
the word of the U.S. Supreme Court would likely carry a lot of weight. 
Two examples serve to illustrate the two scenarios outlined above. In 2003, 
the Court in Lawrence ruled that the criminalization of adult consensual  
same-sex acts was an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process clause in 
part by opining that international law carried that same view.310 Within five 
years, a coalition of European, Latin American, and Oceanian countries 
proposed a UN General Assembly resolution calling for the end to the 
criminalization of homosexual acts.311 Paradoxically, and rather astonishingly, 
at the time of its introduction in the UN General Assembly, the United States 
(then under the George W. Bush Administration) refused for rather muddled 
reasons to sign onto the resolution, an omission quickly rectified by the Obama 
Administration.312 It can be of little doubt that the emphatic statements in 
Lawrence played a large part in the timing of the presentation of that UN 
resolution. From the opposite angle, in 2009, the UN Human Rights Council 
(the body tasked by the UN to monitor human rights around the world) passed 
a resolution condemning “defamation of religion” as a serious human rights 
violation.313 This resolution was widely condemned by Western countries as 
being a not-so-veiled attempt by Islamic countries to clamp down on human 
rights groups within their territories and as a concerted attack on freedom of 
expression.314 Legal pronouncements from important judicial bodies of the 
world (such as the U.S. Supreme Court) would go a long way towards 
preventing this concept of “defamation of religion” from seeping into the 
lexicon of international law and becoming an established norm. 
The nature of the specific international law norm being consulted in the 
context of constitutional interpretation is a vital component of the analysis. 
Whether an international law norm is settled, contested, or emerging will play 
a large part in determining the weight a court in the United States should give 
 
 310 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73, 578–79 (2003). 
 311 See U.N. Gen. Assembly Statement Affirms Rights for All, INT’L LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS & 
INTERSEX ASS’N (Dec. 19, 2008), http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/1211. 
 312 See Neil MacFarquhar, In a First, Gay Rights are Pressed at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/world/19nations.html (describing the United States’s initial refusal to 
sign the declaration); Sue Pleming, In Turnaround, U.S. Signs U.N. Gay Rights Document, REUTERS, Mar. 18, 
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/18/us-rights-gay-usa-idUSTRE52H5CK20090318. 
 313 See Laura MacInnis, U.N. Body Adopts Resolution on Religious Defamation, REUTERS, Mar. 26, 2009, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/26/us-religion-defamation-idUSTRE52P60220090326. 
 314 Id. 
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that law. Moreover, the normative considerations involved will differ 
depending on whether the international law norm is settled, contested, or 
emerging, and will thus profoundly affect the nature of the examination. 
Because of the different treatment that should be given to international law 
depending on its status, this is a deliberation that courts using this law to 
interpret the U.S. Constitution should always verify in the course of their 
analyses. 
3. Position of the United States 
The third and final filter of analysis that a court seeking to use international 
law persuasively within the context of constitutional interpretation should be to 
inquire into the stated position of the United States apropos the particular 
international norm that the court proposes to use.315 As for the other two 
factors described above, the result of this inquiry will not necessarily dictate 
whether that international law should be used in this context, but will inform 
the court as to how those specific norms should be utilized and what policies 
are to be served by such deployment. 
The nature of the contemporary state is one of disaggregation.316 This is 
especially true of liberal democracies but also, albeit to a lesser extent, of more 
authoritarian regimes. This means that in modern times the many different 
components that make up the state act with only a modest degree of concert 
and often pursue their own potentially conflicting interests and motivations.317 
While some cohesion by a state is preferable, because of the myriad of 
operations that a modern state engages in on a daily basis, the pursuit of 
complete coordination on all government business would necessarily grind the 
governmental wheels to a halt and prevent a proper functioning of institutional 
bodies. Therefore, the disaggregation of the state is not only a precise 
description of the state of things, but it is also somewhat normatively desirable 
 
 315 It is important to note that this inquiry is not into what the stated position of the United States is vis-à-
vis the case that is up before the court. The position of the United States on the case at hand will always be 
easy to assess, because either the United States will be an actual litigant in the case, or, in cases of national 
import, will most likely either intervene or file an amicus brief. 
 316 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, International Delegation and State Disaggregation, 20 CONST. POL. ECON. 
323 (2009); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and 
Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041 (2003). 
 317 Easy examples that come to mind are the conflicts that erupt between the military and the diplomatic 
corps of the same nation, who seemingly are often in tension with one another as to how goals ought to be 
pursued. 
GLENSY GALLEYSFINAL 6/28/2011  9:54 AM 
2011] INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 263 
if only for the pragmatic reason that disaggregation forms part of those oils that 
smooth the workings of the whole system. 
Because of the different governmental roles enshrined in the U.S. 
Constitution, the seeds of disaggregation have been a staple of the make-up of 
the U.S. government since its founding. For the purposes of using international 
law as persuasive authority as an aid in constitutional interpretation, this means 
that once a court determines what the stated U.S. position is on a particular 
doctrine of international law, it should take note of it but not behave as if that 
stated position is binding upon it. After all, the task of ultimate arbiter of 
constitutional meaning in the United States rests upon the Supreme Court.318 
Nevertheless, being cognizant of what the United States has stated about 
particular rules of international law is important not only because of the 
repercussions that could be felt as a result of the Court’s opinion, but also 
because these official statements of position are worthy of informed respect 
when squared with a constitutional mandate. 
A very topical example can be hypothesized pertaining to the recent 
controversy regarding the U.S. government’s use of waterboarding—which is 
considered a form of torture319—on terrorism suspects.320 It is not far-fetched 
to think that a case challenging the use of waterboarding could reach the 
Supreme Court in which the United States would argue in the case that it 
reserves the right to use waterboarding in limited circumstances. It is also not a 
stretch of imagination to expect the Court to square the United States’s 
argument with its past actions, which might include a look at pertinent 
international law and the United States’s signing and ratification of binding 
treaties banning all uses of torture (such as the various Geneva Conventions, 
the Convention Against Torture,321 or the ICCPR) or else the United States’s 
vote in favor of the nonbinding Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose 
various substantive provisions have matured into customary international 
law.322 Here the stated position of the United States on the international norm 
against torture serves as a normative behavioral beacon that would appear to be 
 
 318 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review). 
 319 Michael Isikoff, The Truth Will Out, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 6, 2008), http://www.newsweek.com/2008/02/ 
05/the-truth-will-out.html. 
 320 Id. 
 321 G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984). 
 322 See Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS 2 
(2008), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/udhr/udhr_e.pdf; supra notes 289–91. 
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consonant with an evolving notion of the Eighth Amendment that the use of 
torture is constitutionally banned under all instances. 
Although the Court has not delved into deep discussions regarding the 
stated position of the United States on international law it uses to interpret the 
Constitution, it has developed some narratives on the matter. The most typical 
of these is to note, without much elaboration, whether an international treaty to 
which it refers has been signed by the United States, and if so, whether the 
United States has ratified that same authority.323 Unfortunately, in these 
instances, the Court has not explained the import of its notations. In other 
words, is signature without ratification a signal to the Court that it should side 
with the executive against the legislative, or vice versa? Or does this mean that 
because the full treaty implementation has not occurred according to 
constitutional mandate, the Court should treat this as a negative view of the 
substantive rules contained in the treaty? And what about a signed and ratified 
treaty that the United States is not abiding by? Is that something that the Court 
should rectify through interpretation of constitutional law? In some cases, the 
Court has begun to give some answers to these questions. 
Thus, in Roper, Justice Kennedy, in referring to Article 37 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, noted disapprovingly: “[E]very country 
in the world [had] ratified [that treaty] save for the United States and 
Somalia.”324 He further surmised that none of the countries that had ratified the 
treaty had “entered a reservation to the provision” that was the subject matter 
of the case before the Court.325 Justice Kennedy also noted that the ICCPR 
contained similar prohibitions to the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child; further, he noted that even though the United States had ratified the 
ICCPR, it had specifically reserved the provision (pertaining to the execution 
 
 323 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005) (noting that the United States had signed and 
ratified the ICCPR subject to a reservation); Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (noting that the United States had ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390 n.10 (1989) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (noting that even though countries maintained laws allowing for capital punishment of juvenile 
offenders, they had ratified treaties prohibiting the practice, and the United States was similarly situated, 
having signed but not ratified the ICCPR and American Convention on Human Rights and signed and ratified 
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War); Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1988) (noting the United States’s position on the same treaties found in 
Justice Brennan’s dissent in Stanford). 
 324 Roper, 543 U.S. at 576. 
 325 Id. 
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of juveniles) that was the subject matter of Roper.326 In underlining the stated 
position of the United States on both treaties, Justice Kennedy’s point was two-
fold: first, that the failure to ratify was so out of sync with the rest of the world 
that only a disreputable regime such as Somalia shared the United States’s 
position, and second, that the Court felt perfectly free to disregard the stated 
U.S. position on a particular norm of international law if it conflicted with its 
understanding of the U.S. Constitution.327 
Justice Scalia’s understanding of the U.S. failure to ratify one treaty and 
preserve a reservation to the other treaty is unsurprisingly quite different from 
Justice Kennedy’s understanding. In commenting on the Roper majority’s 
acknowledgment that the United States had either not ratified or had reserved 
the treaties that the majority had referenced, Justice Scalia wryly wrote that 
“[u]nless the Court has added to its arsenal the power to join and ratify treaties 
on behalf of the United States, I cannot see how this evidence favors, rather 
than refutes, its position” regarding the constitutionality of executing 
juveniles.328 He went on to note that there could not be a national consensus 
against the execution of juveniles because “the Senate and the President—
those actors our Constitution empowers to enter into treaties . . . have declined 
to join and ratify treaties prohibiting execution of under-18 offenders.”329 
Justice Scalia’s point is superficially palatable but conveniently ignores both 
the normative considerations underlying Justice Kennedy’s point as well as the 
text of the reservation Justice Scalia relies upon. The reservation to the treaty 
prohibiting the execution of juveniles is “subject to . . . Constitutional 
constraints,”330 and unless Justice Scalia takes the view that the Senate is now 
the ultimate arbiter of constitutional meaning, then the reservation,331 by its 
 
 326 See id. at 576. The specific reservation reads: “The United States reserves the right, subject to its 
Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person . . . duly convicted under existing or 
future law permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed 
by persons below eighteen years of age.” ICCPR, supra note 218. 
 327 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 576–78. 
 328 Id. at 622–623 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 329 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2). 
 330 ICCPR, supra note 218. 
 331 Justice Breyer made this same point in his dissent from a denial of certiorari in Knight v. Florida, a 
case where the issue was whether there was a length of time between death sentence and execution that could 
be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (denying petition for certiorari). Noting reservations to the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment enacted by the ratifying U.S. Senate, Justice Breyer 
emphasized that “the treaty reservations say nothing about whether a particular [practice indentified in the 
reservation] is ‘constitutional.’” Id. at 993. Indeed, Justice Breyer noted that the reservation, similar to the one 
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text alone, subjects itself to a constitutional trump. Moreover, Justice Kennedy 
implied that his notation of the U.S. position on these treaties is illustrative of 
the “unusual” character of this form of punishment and not an attempt to bind 
the United States to these treaties through a process of ratification via judicial 
fiat.332 
Whether the United States’s position regarding a specific tenet of 
international law is to be adhered to or disregarded will always ultimately 
hinge upon the Court’s assessment of its constitutionality. Even so, it can 
nonetheless inform the analysis and thus is an important part of this equation. 
Because of the inherent disaggregation of the U.S. government, sometimes the 
stated positions of the United States can be in conflict. This is exemplified 
when a signed treaty, signaling approval by the executive branch, is either 
reserved or never ratified, demonstrating a disapproval by the legislative 
branch. In all cases, the judiciary should take these expressions into account 
when deciding the level of respect and persuasion to afford the substantive 
rules of international law because the motivations that will be at play will 
differ according to the Court’s willingness to conform to (or depart from) that 
expression. In either circumstance, the Court, exhibiting its awareness of what 
other parts of the U.S. government have said on such matters, can only 
enhance the analysis. If that occurs, we can look forward to further judicial 
discussions such as those exhibited between the majority and dissent in Roper 
that will elucidate more of the Court’s thinking about the use of international 
law in this context. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Kennedy stated in Lawrence that the Constitution is subject to the 
passage of time and therefore mutates in meaning as time goes by.333 Part of 
that changing meaning can be garnered by looking at external sources of law, 
such as the wealthy repository of rules that is contained within international 
law. Indeed, international law as persuasive authority already plays a part in 
U.S. constitutional adjudication. The main criticism is that this is done in a 
rather ad hoc manner with seemingly little thought expended towards finding a 
 
identified in Roper, was self-limiting in that its import had to be “‘consistent with the . . . Constitution.’” Id. 
(quoting 136 CONG. REC. 36,192–99 (1990)). 
 332 Justice Kennedy reiterated this point by reference to the United States’s position on the same two 
treaties in Graham. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
 333 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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normatively plausible methodological theory to guide its use. Because this 
practice is destined to continue, it is vital to construct such a methodology. 
In proposing a methodology for the use of international law within the 
framework of constitutional interpretation, it is axiomatic to state that context 
is everything. An analysis detached from the situation in which it exists is not 
only destined to be haphazard, but also to succumb to the accusation that it is 
self-serving and unpredictable. However, by delineating the circumstances 
under which this activity should take place and providing dependable factors 
that link naturally with the policies underlying the comparative enterprise, it is 
possible to avoid the pitfalls identified by the critics. As a consequence, this 
sort of use of international law will create a solid foundation to be built upon as 
this endeavor moves confidently into the future. 
